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Abstract 
The objective of this working paper is to point out actual and potential obstacles to effective protection 
of the fundamental right to data protection, created by rules on jurisdiction and applicable law, and to 
put forward solutions for removing those obstacles with regard to data protection. More precisely, the 
working paper first elaborates on categories of litigation in the field of data protection in order to 
identify potential claimants, defendants and competent administrative and judicial authorities that may 
decide on those remedies. Furthermore, building upon these categories of litigation, the working paper 
seeks to determine jurisdictional issues regarding data protection litigation within the EU, elaborating 
concretely on potential competent courts in case a data subject wants to file a private enforcement 
claim against a controller processing his personal data. Finally, the working paper addresses issues of 
applicable law in data protection litigation, dealing with questions such as the possibility of 
agreements on applicable law, the questions of applicable law if the controller is situated within the 
EU and the questions of extraterritorial application of EU data protection law if the controller is 
established outside of the EU. The working paper concludes with final remarks on the above issues. 
Keywords 
Data protection, private international law, jurisdiction, applicable law, extraterritoriality 
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“We're entering a new world in which data 
may be more important than software.” 
Tim O'Reilly 
1. Introduction* 
In only two decades, the increased use of internet, social media and, more generally, information 
technology has clearly led to profound changes in the functioning of our society – changes that 
represent an ever-increasing challenge and threat for the protection of fundamental rights of European 
citizens. Information technologies not only greatly increase access to and exchange of information, 
facilitate digital trading and enable data transfers, but also, as recent NSA surveillance scandals 
demonstrate, potentially lead to infringements of the fundamental rights to data protection and privacy 
of European citizens. In Europe, these fundamental rights are protected with numerous legal 
instruments. The right to privacy is enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art.7), the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Art.8), and the constitutions of many EU Member States. 
Some legal sources recognise data protection as a separate fundamental right (EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, Art.8); therefore, for the purposes of this article, the term ‘data protection’ will 
be used as encompassing also data protection aspects of privacy.
1
 Within the EU, this fundamental 
right is concretised notably through the Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (Data Protection 
Directive)
2
, and new legislation in this field (proposal for the future Data Protection Regulation
3
 and 
Directive
4
) is currently being considered by the EU legislator.  
While it is arguable whether the fundamental right to data protection is directly applicable among 
individuals
5
, it is beyond doubt that this fundamental right and its concretisations in secondary 
                                                     
*
 The author would like to thank Hielke Hijmans, Jorg Sladič and Joasia Luzak, for their helpful discussions and comments 
on an earlier draft of this paper. Moreover, the author would like to express gratitude to Colette Cuijpers, Johannes 
Eichenhofer, Raphaël Gellert, Gloria González Fuster, Andrea Jelinek, Tuomas Ojanen and Christian Welter for 
providing expertise on Member States’ legislation. Errors and omissions remain those of the author. 
1
 For the purposes of this article, the term ‘data protection’ is used to encompass also data protection aspects of privacy. 
For a discussion in the literature on distinction between data protection and privacy see, for example, M. Tzanou, “Is 
Data Protection the Same as Privacy? An Analysis of Telecommunications’ Metadata Retention Measures”, (2013) 17 
Journal of Internet Law, 26 et seq.; O. Lynskey, “Deconstructing Data Protection: The ‘Added Value’ of a Right to Data 
Protection in the EU Legal Order”, (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 569-597; J. Kokott and C. 
Sobotta, “The distinction between Privacy and Data Protection in the Jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR”, in H. 
Hijmans and H. Kranenborg (ed.), Data Protection Anno 2014: How to Restore Trust? (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014) 
83-95; P. Hustinx, “EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation”, available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/Publications/SpeechArticle/SA2014 [Accessed 18 February 2015].  
2
 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281/31.  
3
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) 
(COM(2012) 11 final).  
4
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data 
(COM(2012)10 final).  
5
 Compare J. Kokott and C. Sobotta, “The distinction between Privacy and Data Protection in the Jurisprudence of the 
CJEU and the ECtHR”, in H. Hijmans and H. Kranenborg (ed.), Data Protection Anno 2014: How to Restore Trust? 
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014), 91.  
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legislation are of relevance not only for the relationships between an individual (data subject
6
) and 
public authorities processing personal data, but also in private law relationships between a data subject 
and a private controller
7
 processing such data. Despite this importance, public (administrative) 
enforcement through Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) currently still plays a major role in data 
protection enforcement
8
. However, this type of enforcement shows certain deficiencies, such as lack of 
resources, limited powers and concerns regarding independence of DPAs
9
. Therefore, there is an 
increasing need to guarantee effective private (judicial) protection of the fundamental right to data 
protection, not least because, in data protection, the breaches can affect several data subjects 
simultaneously, leading to infringements of a potentially larger scope than infringements of other 
rights. Moreover, judicial authorities are in a most suitable position to guarantee a fair balance of data 
protection with other competing rights and values, such as intellectual property, freedom of 
expression, security and economic interests of businesses processing data. Consequently, it is 
important to address these challenges of effective enforcement of data protection not only through 
examining enforcement by DPAs, but also by competent judicial authorities that decide in a 
framework of actions brought by individuals against companies or authorities processing data
10
.  
The first step towards guaranteeing effective judicial protection of the fundamental right to data 
protection is that private international law rules regarding jurisdiction and applicable law for this field 
are framed in a way to enable effective judicial enforcement of this right. More precisely, these rules 
should be framed in a way to enable the European citizens to effectively make use of and protect their 
right to data protection. While the issues of jurisdiction and applicable law in the field of data 
protection have recently attracted attention of the academic literature,
11
 this doctrine remains largely 
focused on the technical question of the applicability of a law of a particular Member State
12
 as 
regulated by Article 4 of the Data Protection Directive
13
 and accords somewhat less attention to the 
                                                     
6
 A 'data subject' is, according to Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive, an ' identified or identifiable natural person'.  
7
 For a definition of a 'controller', see Article 2(d) of the Data Protection Directive.  
8
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress 
(COM(2013) 401 final).  
9
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Data Protection in the European Union: the role of National Data 
Protection Authorities. Strengthening the fundamental rights architecture in the EU II (Luxembourg: Publications Office 
of the European Union, 2010), p. 8.  
10
 Such private enforcement claims are still relatively rare in Europe. The most prominent example of such an action is the 
Schrems v. Facebook case which is a class action filed by 25.000 European citizens against Facebook before Austrian 
courts. For more information see http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/en.html [Accessed 23 February 2015].  
11
 F. F. Wang, “Jurisdiction and Cloud Computing: Further Challenges to Internet Jurisdiction”, (2013) 24 European 
Business Law Review, 589–616; C. Kuner, “Internet Jurisdiction and Data Protection Law: An International Legal 
Analysis (Part 1)”, (2010) 18 International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 176-193; Kuner, “Data 
Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 2)”, (2010) 18 International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology, 227-247; L. Moerel, “The long arm of EU data protection law: Does the Data Protection 
Directive apply to processing of personal data of EU citizens by websites worldwide?”, (2011) 1 International Data 
Privacy Law, 28-46; C. Piltz, “Rechtswahlfreiheit im Datenschutzrecht?”, (2012) K&R, 640-645; T. Schultz, “Carving up 
the Internet: Jurisdiction, Legal Orders, and the Private/Public International Law Interface”, (2008) 19 The European 
Journal of International Law, 799–839; P. P. Swire, “Elephants and Mice Revisited: Law and Choice of Law on the 
Internet”, (2005) 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1975-2001.  
12
 See, for example, L. Moerel, “The long arm of EU data protection law: Does the Data Protection Directive apply to 
processing of personal data of EU citizens by websites worldwide?” (2011) 1 International Data Privacy Law, 28-46.  
13
 See, for example, C. Kuner, European Data Protection Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2012), 114.  
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theoretical interplay between data protection and the instruments of European private international 
law
14
. 
In light of the above, the objective of the present article is to point out actual and potential 
obstacles to effective protection of the fundamental right to data protection, created by the rules on 
jurisdiction and applicable law, and to put forward solutions for removing those obstacles with regard 
to data protection. More precisely, the article first elaborates on the categories of litigation in the field 
of data protection in order to identify potential claimants, defendants and competent administrative 
and judicial authorities that may decide on those remedies (section 2 of the article). Furthermore, 
building upon these categories of litigation, the article seeks to determine jurisdictional issues 
regarding data protection litigation within the EU (section 3 of the article), elaborating concretely on 
potential competent courts in case a data subject wants to file a private enforcement claim against a 
controller processing his personal data. Finally, the article addresses issues of applicable law in data 
protection litigation (section 4 of the article), dealing with questions such as the possibility of 
agreements on applicable law, the questions of applicable law if the controller is situated within the 
EU and the questions of extraterritorial application of EU data protection law if the controller is 
established outside of the EU. The article concludes (section 5) with final remarks on the above issues.  
At the outset, some terminological clarifications are needed. In doctrine, the concepts of 
jurisdiction and applicable law are often treated as overlapping concepts
15
, either in the sense that a 
court’s jurisdiction is determined on the basis of rules regarding applicable law or in the sense that the 
applicable law is necessarily considered to be the one of the court deciding the matter, as expressed by 
the Latin phrase qui elegit iudicem elegit ius.
16
 For the purposes of the present article, the notion of 
‘jurisdiction’ will be used only in the meaning of ‘jurisdiction to adjudicate’17 or, in other words, as 
the competence of the courts to decide in a particular dispute. The focus will thus be on jurisdiction 
such as determined pursuant to Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
18
 which replaced, as of 10 January 2015, 
Regulation 44/2001
19
. It is considered that this issue is distinct from the issue of applicable law which, 
                                                     
14
 The connection between data protection and private international law is addressed, for example, by Kuner, “Data 
Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 1)”, (2010) 18 International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology, 176 et seq.  
15
 This is pointed out also by C. Kuner, “Internet Jurisdiction and Data Protection Law: An International Legal Analysis”, 
(2010) 18 International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 180, who states that ' national data protection 
authorities often equate jurisdiction and applicable law'.  
16
 See, for example, L. Moerel, “The long arm of EU data protection law: Does the Data Protection Directive apply to 
processing of personal data of EU citizens by websites worldwide?”, (2011) 1 International Data Privacy Law, 45, who 
talks about ‘jurisdiction and applicable law regime for consumer contracts’ in Rome I Regulation, whereas this regulation 
only contains rules on applicable law and not on jurisdiction. Kuner, Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law 
(OUP, 2013), 121, understands the notion “jurisdiction” as a capacity of State or entity to have regulatory power over 
data protection and not as a competence of the courts to decide in disputes as this notion is generally understood in 
private international law.  
17
 Berliri, “Jurisdiction and the Internet, and European Regulation 44 of 2001”, (2002) E-Commerce: Law and Jurisdiction. 
The Comparative Law Yearbook of International Business. Special Issue, 1-2, drawing upon the U.S. Third Restatement 
of Foreign Relations Law, distinguishes between the “jurisdiction to prescribe (or legislate), jurisdiction to adjudicate and 
jurisdiction to enforce”. The notion of “jurisdiction” is used in this sense also in F. F. Wang, “Jurisdiction and Cloud 
Computing: Further Challenges to Internet Jurisdiction”, (2013) 24 European Business Law Review, 589-616. Compare 
also C. Kuner, “Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 1)”, (2010) 18 International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology, 184.  
18
 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ L 351/1.  
19
 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 12/1.  
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as is usual in conflict-of-laws, provides an answer to the question which set of rules applies to a 
certain dispute.  
2. Categories of litigation in the field of data protection 
In order to understand for which types of litigation the analysis of the interplay between data 
protection and European private international law is relevant, it is necessary to establish who the 
potential claimants and defendants are in the litigation involving data protection issues, as well as to 
identify what type of remedies they have and which authorities (judicial or administrative) are 
competent to decide about these remedies. The Data Protection Directive regulates the issue of 
remedies in its Article 22 which allows for a judicial remedy “without prejudice to any administrative 
remedy” and “prior to referral to the judicial authority”. It can be concluded that, on a proper 
interpretation, this article allows for two categories of remedies in case of breach of rights of data 
subject.  
Administrative remedies constitute the first category of remedies. Since the Data Protection 
Directive does not specify the type of a particular administrative remedy, this issue is to be regulated 
by the Member States. Member States’ legislation allows for various administrative remedies, for 
example an order with a warning or objection and other orders, such as to disclose information, to 
implement specific measures, to rectify, erase or block specific data, to discontinue processing 
operation or suspend the transfer of data to a third state.
20
 Moreover, national administrative law 
allows for the imposition of fines or for the revocation of licenses.
21
  
The second category is judicial remedies to which recourse is possible in two ways. On the one 
hand, judicial remedies are available after the competent administrative authority has issued an 
administrative decision on the matter, in the sense that this decision can be challenged before the 
competent judicial authorities. This same conclusion can be reached on the basis of Article 28(3) of 
Data Protection Directive which allows for “[d]ecisions by the supervisory authority which give rise to 
complaints” to “be appealed against through the courts”. These judicial proceedings fall within the 
category of ‘public enforcement’ of data protection law.22 It is interesting to note in this regard that the 
Data Protection Directive – neither when distinguishing, in Article 22, between administrative and 
judicial remedies, nor when providing for a possibility of appeal in Article 28(3) – makes no explicit 
reference to the remedies before administrative courts. Despite the fact that the Data Protection 
Directive does not expressly require that the judicial litigation needs to be administrative in nature, 
comparative research of Member States’ legal orders shows that this is often the case.23 In some 
                                                     
20
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Access to data protection remedies in EU Member States 
(Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013), p. 20.  
21
 Ibid.  
22
 This would be the case even if the initial claim before a DPA is lodged by the data subject himself, as allowed for under 
Article 28(4) of the Data Protection Directive, since the data subject would, in such a case, not be a party to the 
proceedings and the procedure before a DPA would result in administrative fines. Moreover, even if it is the data subject 
that lodges an appeal against the decision of a DPA, the procedure still relates to the determination of validity of an 
administrative decision and therefore falls within the category of public enforcement.  
23
 For example, in the Netherlands, the decisions regarding allowing access, rectification or objection to processing of data 
are considered to be administrative (Art. 45 of the Dutch Data Protection Act, Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens 2000) 
and are, as such, dealt with the administrative courts under the Dutch General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet 
bestuursrecht 1992). Similarly, in Austrian law, § 39(1) of the Bundesgesetz über den Schutz personenbezogener Daten 
(Datenschutzgesetz 2000) stipulates that the appeals against decisions of DPA are to be decided by the Federal 
Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht). In Spain, the decisions of the Spanish Data Protection Agency can be 
challenged in the contentious administrative procedure on the basis of Article 18(4) of the Organic Law 15/1999. In 
Finnish law, a challenge of an administrative decision of DPA before judicial authorities would be dealt by administrative 
courts (see Section 45(1) of the Personal Data Act 523/1999). A similar conclusion can be reached for Luxembourg law 
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Member States, however, the opinions of DPAs are not considered to be legally binding and can thus 
not be challenged before the courts.
24
 
On the other hand, data subjects have the right to start judicial proceedings parallel to and 
independently of administrative proceedings before DPAs. These judicial proceedings, initiated by 
data subject, could be categorised as ‘private enforcement’ of data protection law because a data 
subject is a party to the proceedings and the remedies he seeks recourse to are created for his own 
benefit.
25
 The Data Protection Directive does not specify whether this litigation needs to be initiated 
before civil courts, but in several Member States this is indeed the case
26
. The identification of 
litigation as administrative or civil seems particularly important since the determination of jurisdiction 
and applicable law and the use of European private international law instruments also depends on the 
question whether the claim is administrative or civil in nature.
27
 
Finally, the last possible category of litigation is criminal litigation. While EU law does not provide 
for a legal basis for criminal sanctions for data protection breaches, national laws of some Member 
States
28
 allow for such criminal sanctions. Such enforcement obviously qualifies as ‘public 
enforcement’ of data protection law. The table below demonstrates that criminal litigation and 
criminal penalties are possible in the field of data protection. Whereas the present article will not 
further elaborate on the issues of criminal litigation, it will point out under which conditions this type 
of litigation can nevertheless be pertinent in the framework of Regulation 1215/2012 and data 
protection.  
The tables below, illustrating the three main categories of litigation (administrative, civil and 
criminal), take into account the variables mentioned above and are therefore organised according to 
potential parties in data protection litigation as well as the remedies at their disposal.  
  
(Contd.)                                                                  
(see Article 33(2) of Loi du 2 août 2002 relative à la protection des personnes à l’égard du traitement des données à 
caractère personnel).  
24
 For example, in German law, it is not possible to challenge an administrative decision of DPA, issued upon request of the 
data subject pursuant to § 21 of the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz 1990, since this article does not oblige the DPA to take 
specific actions against a controller. Similarly, in Belgian law, when the DPA decides on the basis of complaint, it tries to 
reach an agreement between the parties, in the absence of which it issues a non-binding opinion (Article 31(3) of the Loi 
vie privée 1992).  
25
 For the purposes of definition of the notion of 'private enforcement' in the field of data protection, inspiration can be 
drawn from EU competition law where this term is defined as ‘a litigation, in which private parties advance independent 
civil claims or counterclaims based on the EC competition provisions’; see C. D. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu, European 
Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland: Hart, 2003), p. 
xxiv.  
26
 In German law, this is not explicitly regulated by the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz 1990, but rather by the general rules on 
allocation of jurisdiction to specific courts (§ 13 of the Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz 1975). In Austrian law, a claim for 
damages pursuant to the Datenschutzgesetz 2000 has to be lodged with the regional civil court (Landesgericht) in whose 
district the plaintiff has his domicile or seat (see Article 33(4) juncto Article 32(4) of Datenschutzgesetz 2000). In 
Spanish law, in cases where the data controller it is a private party, claims for compensation have to be lodged with the 
ordinary (i.e. civil) jurisdiction (Article 19 of the Organic Law 15/1999). Similarly, in Finnish law, cases involving 
liability in damages are decided by the civil courts (see Section 47 of the Personal Data Act 523/1999).  
27
 For example, according to its Article 1, Regulation 1215/2012 does not apply to administrative matters.  
28
 See, for example, Spanish law (Arts. 197-201 of the Criminal Code 1995); Austrian law (Article 51 of Datenschutzgesetz 
2000); Slovenian law (Article 143 of the Criminal Code 2008).  
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Administrative litigation path  
Claimant Defendant Remedies Legal base Type of 
enforcement 
Competent 
authority 
DPA Controller 
Processor 
Administrative 
remedies (e.g. 
erasure of data)  
Art.28(3) of Data 
Protection 
Directive 
Public  DPA or other 
administrative 
authority 
Controller 
Processor  
DPA Challenging of 
DPA decision  
Art.28(3) of Data 
Protection 
Directive 
Public  Judicial: in 
principle 
administrative 
court 
Data subject  DPA  Challenging of 
DPA decision
 
Art.28(3) of Data 
Protection 
Directive
29
 
Public  Judicial: in 
principle 
administrative 
court 
Civil litigation path  
Claimant Defendant Remedies Legal base Type of 
enforcement 
Competent 
authority 
Data subject
30
 Controller 
Processor 
Judicial remedies  
- injunction
31
  
- damages 
Art. 22 and 
23 of Data 
Protection 
Directive  
Private  Judicial: 
civil court
 
Collective/ 
representative 
claims on behalf of 
data subject 
Controller 
Processor  
Ibid.  Member 
States’ 
legislation 
Private  Ibid. 
Controller 
Processor  
DPA/Member 
State 
Damages action 
against DPA/Member 
State for wrongful 
administrative 
decision (state 
liability)  
 Public Judicial: 
civil court  
 
                                                     
29
 Since Article 28(3) of Data Protection Directive does not specify who can lodge the appeal against the decision of DPA, 
an appeal by data subject is possible only if the law of the Member State allows for challenging of a DPA decision by the 
data subject in case he is not a party to the administrative proceedings before the DPA. The legislation of Member States 
provides only for limited possibilities to a data subject to challenge such a decision. For example, in Spain, according to 
the Judgments of the Tribunal Supremo of 6 November 2007, 10 December 2008 and 6 October 2009, the data subject 
can only challenge the part of the decision that does not concern the sanction. In Dutch law, a data subject can make a 
request to court to invalidate a decision of a DPA to approve a code of conduct or decision not to take enforcement 
measures (see Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code). In Austrian law, a data subject can challenge a decision of a DPA 
issued upon a complaint pursuant to Art. 31 DSG 2000 before the Federal Court of Administration (see Article 39 of 
Datenschutzgesetz 2000 and Art. 130 of Federal Constitutional Law - B-VG).  
30
 It seems somewhat difficult to imagine instances where the claimant would be a controller or processor that would 
institute proceedings against a data subject. One could potentially imagine a breach, by a data subject, of a contract 
concluded between him and the data controller/processor, but since data subject is not the one processing data, such a 
breach would not constitute a breach of data protection legislation.  
31
 For example, ordering access to data or ordering to delete/erase/rectify data.  
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Criminal litigation path 
Claimant Defendant Remedies Legal 
base 
Type of 
enforcement 
Competent 
authority 
Prosecutor (private 
or public)  
Controller 
Processor 
Criminal penalties (fines, 
imprisonment) 
Member 
States’ 
law 
Public  Judicial: 
criminal court 
3. Jurisdiction regarding data protection litigation within the EU 
3.1 Does Regulation 1215/2012 apply to data protection disputes? 
In order to determine which court is competent within the framework of data protection litigation, it is 
first necessary to clarify whether EU rules on jurisdiction are applicable at all in this domain. More 
precisely, a clarification is needed as to whether data protection is covered by the notion of ‘civil and 
commercial matters’ within the meaning of Regulation 1215/2012.32 Given that it is debatable whether 
data protection should be classified under administrative or civil law
33
, doubts could be raised as to 
whether this field is covered by the scope ratione materiae of Regulation 1215/2012. Whereas civil 
and commercial matters are, in principle, covered by private law, administrative law falls within the 
domain of public law
34
, which could make it difficult to extend the application of the regulation to this 
field, in particular because, in continental legal orders, the courts are still relying on the public-private 
law divide
35
 in order to determine the applicability of the Regulation 1215/2012.
36
  
It seems however that the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), when determining the scope of 
application of Regulation 1215/2012, bases itself neither on the public-private law divide
37
 nor on the 
issue before which court the claim is brought
38
. Rather, the criterion that is pertinent is which parties 
are involved in the dispute: if the dispute arises between two private parties, the regulation applies
39
; 
                                                     
32
 See, in particular, Article 1(1) of Regulation 1215/2012.  
33
 An indication that data protection law could form part of administrative law can be inferred from the fact that Data 
Protection Directive provides for the possibility, in its Article 22, for administrative remedies, which would not be the 
case if the area was qualified as civil or commercial law. See for example also P. Cane, Administrative Law, 5th ed. (OUP, 
2011), 138, who seems to treat the UK Data Protection Act as a part of administrative law.  
34
 P. Rogerson, in: U. Magnus, P. Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation, 2nd ed. (Munich: sellier, 2012), 54, stresses that the 
Member States from the civil law system recognise a clear distinction between public and private law, whereas the 
common law countries do not have such a firm conception of this distinction.  
35
 The doctrine points out that data protection law can be placed on the boarderline between public and private law. See L. 
Bygrave, “Determining applicable law pursuant to European Data Protection Legislation” (2000) 16 Computer Law and 
Security Report, 252; C. Kuner, “Internet Jurisdiction and Data Protection Law: An International Legal Analysis (Part 
1)”, (2010) 18 International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 178. 
36
 B. Hess, T. Pfeiffer, P. Schlosser, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States, Study 
JLS/C4/2005/03, 34. Moreover, P. Mankowski, in T. Rauscher (ed.), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht 
EuZPR/EuIPR. Kommentar. Brüssel I-VO. LugÜbk 2007 (Munich: sellier, 2011), 95, points out that, even though the 
Regulation No 44/2001 (now Regulation 1215/2012) expressly refrains from using the public-private divide, the use of 
the term ‘civil and commercial matters’ leads to the same the same result.  
37
 For example, in cases of private enforcement of competition law, it does not matter whether the law that is enforced is 
public in nature. See pending case C-352/13, CDC [2013] OJ C 298/2. 
38
 See Article 1(1) of Regulation 1215/2012, according to which this regulation ‘shall apply in civil and commercial matters 
whatever the nature of the court or tribunal’. Emphasis added.  
39
 For example, in Case C-265/02, Frahuil [2004] ECR I-1543, the Court focused only on the relationship between the 
parties to the procedure which was governed by private law. The circumstance that the content of the claim was the 
recovery of sums paid to discharge customs duties, was not relevant for the application of the Brussels convention.  
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if, on the contrary, one of the parties is a public authority, exercising its public powers, the scope of 
application of the regulation is not triggered
40
. The precise scope of the notion of ‘exercise of public 
powers’ can be best understood by reference to the subsequent case-law of the CJEU in which this 
court excluded from the scope of Regulation 44/2001 (now Regulation 1215/2012), for example, 
actions against a State for damages caused during the Second World War
41
; a claim brought by a body 
of public law (Eurocontrol) against a company governed by private law for the payment of charges 
imposed by this body
42
; or an action brought by the agent responsible for administering public 
waterways against a private person to recover the costs of the removal of a wreck
43
. In other cases, 
however, the Regulation was nevertheless deemed applicable, despite the fact that one of the parties 
was a public authority, due to the fact that this authority acted as a private party. This was the case, for 
example, regarding an action of recovery, by a public body lacking prerogatives of its own, of sums of 
social assistance to the divorced spouse and child
44
; a claim of a State against a private person for 
enforcement of a guarantee contract enabling a third person to supply a guarantee required and defined 
by that State
45
 or even damages action of a public authority against a private person for loss caused by 
a tortious conspiracy to commit tax fraud
46
.  
When applying the abovementioned case-law concerning the scope of application of Regulation 
1215/2012 to the field of data protection, it is necessary to bear in mind that the line of demarcation 
between cases falling under the notion of ‘civil and commercial matters’ and those not falling under 
that notion is based on a case-by-case approach, making it difficult to discern a priori a clear scope of 
application of the regulation. In each particular litigation involving administrative authorities dealing 
with data protection, an exact analysis of the prerogatives of these authorities would need to be 
conducted. In data protection disputes, the main issue which will arise in this regard will be the 
circumstance that one of the parties, the DPA, can in principle be qualified as a public authority, as 
explained below.  
3.1.1 Administrative litigation path 
It seems that Regulation 1215/2012 will not be applicable to cases brought under the administrative 
litigation path, not because the competence for them is in principle vested in the administrative 
courts
47
, but because it appears that such a litigation is covered by the abovementioned notion of 
‘certain actions between a public authority and a person governed by private law’ in which ‘the public 
authority is acting in the exercise of its public powers’. The test of the applicability of Regulation 
1215/2012 in administrative disputes relating to data protection is thus two-pronged: on the one hand, 
it needs to be established whether the party to the proceedings is a public authority and, on the other 
hand, whether it is acting in the exercise of its public powers.  
                                                     
40
 See, for example, Case 29/76, LTU [1976] ECR 1541, para 4; Case 814/79, Rüffer [1980] ECR 3807, para 8; Case 
C-167/00, Henkel [2002] ECR I-8111, para 26; Case C-271/00, Baten [2002] ECR I-10489, para 30; Case C-266/01, 
Préservatrice foncière TIARD [2003] ECR I-4867, para 22; Case C-172/91, Sonntag [1993] ECR I-1963, paragraph 20; 
Case C-292/05, Lechouritou and Others [2007] ECR I-1519, para 31; Case C-420/07, Apostolides [2009] ECR I-3571, 
para 43; Case C-154/11, Mahamdia, [2012] ECR I-0000, para 56; Case C-645/11, Sapir and Others, [2013] ECR I-0000, 
para 33; and Case C-49/12, Sunico and Others, [2012] ECR I-0000, para 34.  
41
 Case C-292/05, Lechouritou and Others, [2007] ECR I-1519.  
42
 Case 29/76, LTU, [1976] ECR 1541.  
43
 Case 814/79, Rüffer, [1980] ECR 3807.  
44
 Case C-271/00, Baten, [2002] ECR I-10489. 
45
 Case C-266/01, Préservatrice foncière TIARD, [2003] ECR I-4867.  
46
 Case C-49/12, Sunico and Others, [2013] ECR I-0000.  
47
 As already mentioned, Regulation 1215/2012, according to its Article 1(1), applies ‘whatever the nature of the court or 
tribunal’.  
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Regarding the first issue, the most obvious party in data protection litigation that can have the 
capacity of public authority is the DPA. It is beyond doubt that the DPAs have the quality of public 
authorities, since it stems clearly from the Data Protection Directive that the supervisory authority in 
charge of monitoring the application of this directive has to be a public authority
48
. To be more 
precise, DPAs are public supervisory bodies responsible for the enforcement of the law towards 
controllers. The proposal for the future Data Protection Regulation brings out even more clearly the 
public nature of the supervisory authority. In fact, according to the proposed regulation
49
, the 
supervisory authority ‘shall be empowered to impose administrative sanctions’50. Moreover, since 
controllers can also act in the capacity of a public body, administrative litigation is possible also if the 
controller or processor that process data of a data subject act as a public authority.  
Concerning the second issue, it is submitted that the DPAs would indeed exercise their public 
powers when enforcing data protection legislation not only because they are empowered to issue 
‘administrative remedies’ within the meaning of Article 22 of the Data Protection Directive, but also 
because they are endowed with the powers of investigation and intervention as provided for by the 
Article 28(3) of this directive
51
. Therefore, in cases where one of the interested parties – either a 
controller/processor or a data subject – challenges the administrative decision of a DPA before an 
administrative court, this DPA therefore seems to act as a public authority in the exercise of its public 
powers. This is because the administrative dispute concerns the legality of an administrative decision 
in the adoption of which the DPA acted through the exercise of its public powers. Consequently, in the 
light of the CJEU case-law exposed above, it does not seem that an administrative law dispute in 
which a private party challenges the decision of the DPA before national courts should be considered 
as being covered by the notion of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Regulation 
1215/2012 which therefore does not apply in such cases. However, if a controller is a public body, it 
seems less clear whether the processing of data by this controller would amount to the exercise of its 
public powers; in such instances, the applicability of Regulation 1215/2012 would need to be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis.  
As explained below, with regard to the civil litigation path, the analysis regarding the applicability 
of Regulation 1215/2012 will be comparable as the one regarding the administrative litigation.  
3.1.2 Civil litigation path 
Similarly, in civil path of data protection litigation, the question whether the claim falls within the 
notion of ‘civil and commercial matters’ will primarily depend on the question who the parties to the 
procedure are. In this regard, several potential claimants can be identified. The most obvious claimant 
is of course the data subject, defined in the Data Protection Directive as ‘identified or identifiable 
natural person’,52 a wording that indicates that companies, for example, cannot be qualified as data 
                                                     
48
 See Article 28 of the Data Protection Directive.  
49
 See Article 79 of the proposed Data Protection Regulation.  
50
 However, considering that the range of sanctions varies from 250.000 EUR to 1.000.000 EUR, one might wonder 
whether the latter amount of sanctions can still be considered as administrative and not criminal in nature. From a 
comparative perspective, in French law, a sanction of 300.000 EUR is already considered as being criminal in nature 
(Art. 226-16 of the French Criminal Code 2004). In German law, administrative fines range from 50.000 to 300.000 EUR 
(§ 43 of the German Federal Data Protection Act). See also G. Thüsing, J. Traut, “The Reform of European Data 
Protection Law: Harmonisation at Last?” (2013) 5 Intereconomics, 275, who equally point out the controversy around the 
amount of administrative sanctions, drawing a parallel with sanctions in EU competition law. 
51
 Such public powers are confirmed also in the legislation of different Member States. See, for example, Article 11 of the 
French Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés or Article 30 of the Austrian 
Datenschutzgesetz 2000.  
52
 See Article 8(a) of the Data Protection Directive.  
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subjects. The individuals engaging in civil data protection litigation
53
 can, depending on the legal 
order of a particular Member State, request damages
54
 or an injunction, for example a request to 
remove/erase or modify data appearing online
55
.  
Another alternative of civil litigation path is a national collective action on behalf of data subject, 
depending on whether such a collective action is available in a particular Member State.
56
 Despite the 
initiatives in this sense, collective redress is currently not (yet) regulated on the EU level.
57
 
Nevertheless, the importance of collective or representative claims in the field of data protection 
should not be neglected, notably given the fact that data protection infringements can simultaneously 
affect a large number of data subjects. An example of such a collective claim on a national level is the 
currently pending Austrian case Schrems v. Facebook
58
. Collective claims raise important issues of 
jurisdiction and applicable law.
59
 The current jurisdictional rules in force, however, ill-suited for 
collective claims.
60
  
Yet another alternative are representative claims filed by an authority or organisation on behalf of 
data subject, although it might be debatable whether such claims could be qualified as civil litigation if 
the data subject is represented by a public authority. In any event, the current Data Protection 
Directive does not provide for the express possibility of representative claims before the courts. While 
its Article 28(3) does give DPAs the right to ‘engage in legal proceedings’ and to bring violations ‘to 
the attention of judicial authorities’, it is not entirely clear whether this Article could also cover claims 
for damages on behalf of data subject. To the contrary, the proposed Data Protection Regulation 
includes the possibility of such representative claims in its Article 76(1).  
                                                     
53
 An example of such a claim is an action of an individual against an internet service provider requesting, by way of 
injunction, that his data is treated according to the data protection laws in force or a claim for damages against this same 
internet service provider for unauthorised publishing of his personal data. 
54
 See Article 23 of the Data Protection Directive. It is to be noted, however, that these laws do not specify whether the data 
subject can request both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.  
55
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Access to data protection remedies in EU Member States 
(Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013), p. 20.  
56
 In the Netherlands, for example, the Wet collectieve afhandeling massaschade 2005 is currently under review so as to 
include also collective actions for compensation of damages (see the proposal Wijziging van het Burgerlijk wetboek en 
het Wetboek van burgerlijke rechtsvordeing teneinde de afwikkeling van massaschade in een collective actie mogelijsk te 
maken, Consultatieversie Juli 2014, available at 2014-06_Voorstel_Titel_14a_sv_305a_consultatieversie.pdf [Accessed 
25 February 2015]). In Germany, the legislator is currently adopting legislation that would allow for collective actions in 
the field of data protection. See Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der zivilrechtlichen Durchsetzung von 
verbraucherschützenden Vorschriften des Datenschutzrechts, available at 
<www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/Gesetze/RegE-UKlaG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile>. In Austria, 
collective redress is available on the basis of several procedural rules, such as joinder of claims, in order to develop the 
‘Austrian model of the class action’; see G. E. Kodek, “Collective Redress in Austria”, (2009) 622 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, The Globalization of Class Actions, 86 et seq. Furthermore, see also 
the Danish Class Action Act 2008 and the Swedish Group Proceedings Act 2003.  
57
 See Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective 
redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law (2013/396/EU) 
[2013] OJ L 201/60. 
58
 See http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/en.html [Accessed 23 February 2015]. 
59
 Such as demonstrated for example by Case C-167/00, Henkel [2002] ECR I-8111; C-292/05, Lechouritou and Others 
[2007] ECR I-1519; C-21/76, Handelskwekerij Bier v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, [1976] ECR 1735. Compare, for 
example, also in the field of competition law, pending case C-352/13, CDC [2013] OJ C 298/2. B. Hess, “A Coherent 
Approach to European Collective Redress”, in D. Fairgrieve, E. Lein, Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford: 
Oxford, 2012), stresses the need for a coherent instrument on cross-border collective redress in the EU.  
60
 E. Lein, “Cross-Border Collective Redress and Jurisdiction under Brussels I: A Mismatch”, in D. Fairgrieve, E. Lein, 
Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford: Oxford, 2012), 129 et seq.  
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Finally, the controller or processor can institute a claim of state liability due to a wrong assessment 
by the DPA before the civil courts. However, since this is not a classic example of private enforcement 
of data protection law, it will not be further elaborated upon in this article.  
Analysing the issues above from the perspective of Regulation 1215/2012, it is to be stressed 
that claims between private parties would, in general, be covered by the scope of the 
regulation, save for cases expressly excluded due to their subject matter.61 Hence, the claims 
of a data subject against a controller/processor requesting injunction or damages will 
undoubtedly be covered by the scope of application of the regulation. 
3.1.3 Criminal litigation path 
According to CJEU case-law, Regulation 1215/2012
62
 can sometimes be used even to determine 
jurisdiction in criminal litigation if the litigation is instituted by a private prosecutor. As it stems from 
the case Sonntag, a damages action for civil compensation brought before a criminal court against a 
teacher having caused injury to a pupil by way of a culpable and unlawful breach of his duties of 
supervision falls under the notion of ‘civil matters’63. Therefore, in case of a (civil) claim for damages 
made by a private prosecutor in the framework of criminal proceedings, Regulation 1215/2012 would 
still be applicable. However, since the Data Protection Directive does not provide for criminal 
sanctions for wrongful processing of personal data, this jurisdictional basis will be less important in 
the field of data protection and will not be further elaborated upon in the framework of this article.  
3.2 Possible jurisdictional bases for data protection litigation under Regulation 1215/2012  
Once it is determined that Regulation 1215/2012 applies for a particular data protection litigation, the 
claimant can, apart from instituting an action in the domicile of the defendant (Article 4(1)), also make 
use of several special jurisdictional bases, notably the jurisdiction for consumer contracts (Articles 17 
et seq.), for contracts in general (Article 7(1)) as well as jurisdiction for torts (Article 7(2)).  
3.2.1 Jurisdiction of the domicile of defendant  
The most general rule for determining jurisdiction according to Regulation 1215/2012 is the rule actor 
sequitur forum rei
64
, according to which the defendant can be sued in the courts of his domicile, as 
stipulated by Article 4(1) of this regulation. However, with regard to data protection, several 
observations need to be made.  
At the outset, it is important to clarify that Regulation 1215/2012 will in principle not be applicable 
when the defendant has his domicile outside the EU.
65
 The notion of ‘domicile’ in this regulation 
                                                     
61
 P. Rogerson, in: U. Magnus, P. Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation, 2nd ed. (Munich: sellier, 2012), 55.  
62
 Note that the case-law still relates to Regulation No 44/2001 or even the Convention of 27 September 1968 on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [1978] OJ L 304/36, ‘the Brussels 
Convention’), but for reasons of consistency, this article refers to Regulation 1215/2012.  
63
 Case C-172/91, Sonntag [1993] ECR I-1963.  
64
 For the use of this expression, see for example P. Vlas, in: U. Magnus, P. Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation, 2nd ed. 
(Munich: sellier, 2012), 78. In case-law, see for example, Cases C-412/98, Group Josi [2000] ECR I-5925, para 35; C-
256/00, Besix [2002] ECR I-1699, para 52.  
65
 As it stems from Article 4 of Regulation 1215/2012, this Regulation is only applicable if the lawsuit is filed against a 
person ‘domiciled in a Member State’. Moreover, Recital 14 of this regulation clarifies that a ‘defendant not domiciled in 
a Member State should in general be subject to the national rules of jurisdiction applicable in the territory of the Member 
State of the court seised’, although there might be exceptions to this rule, such as jurisdiction for consumers and 
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covers both domicile of natural and legal persons and, in a case of a company, encompasses its 
statutory seat, central administration or principal place of business.
66
 Therefore, if the data subject 
wants to file a lawsuit, for example, directly against a company providing services of a search engine 
or against another company providing online services, established in the US, this data subject will not 
be able to rely on the rules of the Regulation. In practice this means that a European data subject who 
wants to sue a company established in a third country can only rely on the rules of private international 
law of his own Member State; if these rules do not give him the possibility to file a lawsuit in the 
Member State of his domicile, he will be obliged to do so before the courts of that country.
67
 This 
would lead, however, to a rather interesting result where civil litigation could not be brought within 
the EU, whereas administrative litigation could, since under the Data Protection Directive, a DPA 
could request compliance also from a controller not established in the EU.
68
 A comparable issue arose 
in the CJEU case Google Spain and Google
69
 where the Spanish DPA issued a decision both against 
the US parent company Google Inc. as well as against its Spanish subsidiary Google Spain. The two 
companies brought separate actions against that decision before the Spanish National High Court that 
decided to join the two actions.
70
 It is not clear from the facts of the case whether the US company 
Google Inc. contested the jurisdiction of the Spanish courts in this matter, but since it was challenging 
an (administrative) decision of a national DPA, its only possibility was to challenge it before the 
courts of that same Member State. It is nevertheless important to bear in mind that, in the Google 
Spain and Google case, Regulation 1215/2012 was not applicable for several reasons: not only 
because the Spanish DPA was, when issuing a decision against Google, most likely acting in the 
exercise of public powers,
71
 but even if this was not the case, this regulation would not be applicable 
due to the fact that one of the defendants (Google Inc.) was domiciled in the US and another defendant 
(Google Spain) in the same Member State as the applicant which would trigger the application of 
domestic conflict-of-law rules and not those of Regulation 1215/2012
72
. Therefore, within the EU, 
there was an absence of a cross-border element because the data subject and the European subsidiary 
of the controller were situated in the same Member State.
73
  
Furthermore, going beyond the legal issues of the case Google Spain and Google, two important 
questions need to be addressed. On the one hand, a question can be asked whether, in the field of data 
protection, there should be an exception to this general rule of non-applicability of Regulation 
1215/2012 if the defendant is domiciled in a third country in the same way as provided for consumers 
or employees
74
 which are traditionally regarded as weaker (contractual) parties. It is submitted that 
(Contd.)                                                                  
employees. For the definition of the notion of ‘domicile’, see for example P. Vlas, in: U. Magnus, P. Mankowski, 
Brussels I Regulation, 2nd ed. (Munich: sellier, 2012), 80.  
66
 See Article 63 of Regulation 1215/2012.  
67
 Along these lines, the current President of the European Commission Juncker suggested that European citizens should 
enforce their data protection rights in US courts. See J. C. Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, 
Growth, Farness and Democratic Change. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission (2014), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/docs/pg_en.pdf [Accessed 26 February 2015].  
68
 See Article 4 juncto Article 28 of the Data Protection Directive. For more on jurisdiction over foreign entities, see Kuner, 
“Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 2)”, 18 International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology (2010), 228 et seq.  
69
 Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google, [2014] not yet published in ECR.  
70
 Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google, [2014] not yet published in ECR, para 18.  
71
 See heading 0. of the present article.  
72
 See the first paragraph of Recital 14 of Regulation 1215/2012, according to which a defendant that is not domiciled in a 
Member State is subjected to the jurisdictional rules applicable in the Member State of the court seised.  
73
 See P. Mankowski, in T. Rauscher (ed.), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR/EuIPR. Kommentar. 
Brüssel I-VO. LugÜbk 2007 (Munich: sellier, 2011), 154-155.  
74
 See the second paragraph of Recital 14 of Regulation 1215/2012, according to which, “in order to ensure the protection 
of consumers and employees […] certain rules of jurisdiction in this Regulation should apply regardless of the 
defendant’s domicile”.  
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such a modification of Regulation 1215/2012 would not only be beneficial for the European data 
subjects, but it would also strike a fair balance between different positions of a stronger controller and 
a weaker data subject, regardless of whether data is processed on a contractual basis or not.
75
 
On the other hand, it is important to address the question whether, for the purposes of civil 
litigation, the notion of ‘domicile’ in Regulation 1215/201276 and the notion of ‘establishment’ in data 
protection legislation
77
 necessarily have to be given the same meaning. It needs to be specified, 
however, that for the purposes of data protection legislation, it is the establishment that processes 
personal data of data subject in the context of its activities that is pertinent and not any other 
establishment. It is true that in practice, this problem might not be as pressing, given the fact that many 
of the third country companies that process personal data often have a subsidiary within the EU, such 
as Google, Facebook or Amazon. Yet, in case of other companies established in third countries this 
issue might be important. It is submitted that such an interpretation, leading to parallelism between 
jurisdictional rules and rules regarding applicable law would be beneficial since it would give legal 
certainty to a company processing personal data on where it can be sued and according to which rules. 
Moreover, it would also greatly facilitate the work of national courts since they would know that, once 
they establish a domicile of a company pursuant to Regulation 1215/2012, they could also reasonably 
assume that data protection legislation applies.
78
  
3.2.2 Consumer jurisdiction: contractual jurisdiction  
3.2.2.1 Relevance of consumer jurisdiction for data protection  
Given the fact that the data subject has to be, as per the definition from the Data Protection Directive, 
a natural person
79
, it is possible to qualify him as a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of Regulation 
1215/2012. However, it is to be stressed that, unlike in the US
80
, data protection law in the EU is not 
considered as part of consumer law and the simple fact that the data subject is a natural person does 
not immediately make him a consumer within the meaning of Regulation 1215/2012. In fact, in order 
to be covered by this regulation, such a consumer has to conclude a contract ‘for a purpose which can 
be regarded as being outside his trade or profession’81. If a person concludes a contract for the sale of 
goods or uses services online for his private purposes only and his data is processed in the framework 
of this contract, then he will be able to rely on the consumer jurisdiction.  
A problem that can arise with regard to the qualification of the data subject as a consumer is the 
fact that he will often use (especially online) services (or even goods) for a dual, private and 
professional use. Typically, e-mail accounts, Skype, web messengers or even Facebook will often be 
                                                     
75
 For a proposed modification of Regulation 1215/2012, see section 0. of this article.  
76
 See Article 4 juncto Article 63 of Regulation 1215/2012 as well as Article 18(1) of this Regulation.  
77
 See Article 4(1) of the Data Protection Directive or in Article 3(1) of the proposal for the future Data Protection 
Regulation.  
78
 A counterargument against such parallel interpretations could be the fact that Article 4(1) of the Data Protection Directive 
or in Article 3(1) refer to processing “in the context of the activities of an establishment” (emphasis added) and not 
merely to an establishment of data controller or processor.  
79
 Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive.  
80
 In the US, the protection of privacy is entrusted with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that is empowered, pursuant 
to the Federal Trade Commission Act 1914, to enforce unfair and deceptive practices towards consumers under Section 5 
of the FTC Act; this same section has also been used to enforce the right to privacy. In theory, see also P. Bernal, Internet 
Privacy Rights. Rights to Protect Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University Presss, 2014), 113, who points out that 
the FTC has a role ‘as a protector of consumer rights’.  
81
 Article 17(1) of Regulation 1215/2012.  
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used for both purposes. According to the Gruber
82
 case of the CJEU, such a dual usage would not 
trigger consumer jurisdiction
83
. In fact, the purpose of specific jurisdictional clauses to protect the 
consumer as the weaker contractual party would not be attained if a contract is partially linked to a 
trade or profession of a contractual party.
84
 The degree of professional use according to this case-law 
has to be ‘so slight as to be marginal’ and has to have ‘only a negligible role’ relating to the entire 
contract.
85
 It is interesting to note that the test to determine whether a person is to be considered a 
consumer is not the one of the ‘centre of gravity’ of the activities of a person, but rather, one could 
say, one of ‘contamination’. For a data subject, this means that, in case of the slightest non-marginal 
professional use of goods or services, he will not be considered as a consumer for the purposes of 
Regulation 1215/2012 unless he proves otherwise
86
. 
In cases where the data subject is considered to be a consumer, it will further need to be established 
whether other conditions of applicability of consumer jurisdiction are fulfilled. What can be 
particularly problematic is to determine whether a consumer (data subject) concluded a contract with a 
professional who directs his activities to the Member State of his domicile.
87
 The case-law in this 
regard, starting with Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof88 and continuing with Mühlleitner89 and Emrek90, 
is well established. In Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, the CJEU set up a non-exhaustive list of factors 
indicating when a professional directed his commercial activity to the Member State of the consumer’s 
domicile.
91
 In Mühlleitner, the CJEU further specified that the application of a special consumer 
jurisdiction does not depend on the conclusion of a consumer contract at a distance
92
 and, in Emrek, 
the CJEU decided that a causal link between the means of directing an activity through an internet site 
                                                     
82
 Case C-464/01, Gruber, [2005] ECR I-439.  
83
 For a commentary of the case in the doctrine, see L. Idot, “Notion de contrat conclu par les consommateurs”, (2005) 
Europe, 27-28; P. Mankowski, “’Gemischte’ Verträge und der persönliche Anwendungsbereich des Internationalen 
Verbraucherschutzrechts”, (2005) Praxis des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts, 503-509; J. Vannerom, 
“Consumer Notion: Natural or Legal Persons and Mixed Contracts”, in E. Terryn et al. (ed.), Landmark cases of EU 
consumer law: in honour of Jules Stuyck (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2013), 57-72. 
84
 Case C-464/01, Gruber, [2005] ECR I-439, para 39. A. Staudinger, in T. Rauscher (ed.), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und 
Kollisionsrecht EuZPR/EuIPR. Kommentar. Brüssel I-VO. LugÜbk 2007 (Munich: sellier, 2011), 379, points out that the 
protection of weaker contractual party as well as the circumstance that consumer jurisdiction represents an exception to 
the general jurisdictional rules, require a restrictive interpretation of the notion of ‘consumer’. Moreover, as pointed out 
by L. Gillies, “European Union: Modified Rules of Jurisdiction for Electronic Consumer Contracts” (2001) 17 Computer 
Law & Security Report 6, 397, the CJEU ruled already in 1978 in Case 150/70, Bertrand v Ott [1978] ECR 1431, that 
consumer jurisdiction applies only to consumers as private individuals and not to companies.  
85
 Case C-464/01, Gruber, [2005] ECR I-439, para 39.  
86
 The fact that the consumer carries the burden of proof regarding marginal use for professional purposes is pointed out by 
A. Staudinger, in T. Rauscher (ed.), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR/EuIPR. Kommentar. Brüssel 
I-VO. LugÜbk 2007 (Munich: sellier, 2011), 383.  
87
 See Article 17(1)(c) of Regulation 1215/2012. Less problematic will be the criterion, equally contained in this article, 
seeking to determine whether a professional pursues his activities in the Member State of consumer’s domicile.  
88
 Case C-585/08, Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, [2010] ECR I-12527.  
89
 Case C-190/11, Mühlleitner, [2012] published in the electronic Reports of Cases. 
90
 Case C-218/12, Emrek, [2013] not yet published in ECR.  
91
 See Case C-585/08, Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, [2010] ECR I-12527, para 93. Those criteria are, for example, “the 
international nature of the activity, […] use of a language or a currency other than the language or currency generally 
used in the Member State in which the trader is established […], mention of telephone numbers with an international 
code, outlay of expenditure on an internet referencing service in order to facilitate access to the trader’s site or that of its 
intermediary by consumers domiciled in other Member States, use of a top-level domain name other than that of the 
Member State in which the trader is established, and mention of an international clientele […]”. 
92
 See case Case C-190/11, Mühlleitner, [2012] published in the electronic Reports of Cases, para 45. It is, however, not 
clear from this case-law whether any of the other phases leading to the conclusion of contract (negotiation, offer, 
acceptance) needs to be done per distance; see, in this regard, Brkan, “Arrêt Mühlleitner: vers une protection renforcée 
des consommateurs dans l’U.E.”, (2013) European Journal of Consumer Law, 116. 
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and the actual conclusion of a contract is not necessary
93
. However, it is yet to be seen, for data 
protection, whether these criteria will have to be adjusted to take into account the place of processing 
of data and other particularities of data protection.  
If all the criteria for the applicability of consumer jurisdiction are fulfilled, the competent court will 
be determined according to the rules on consumer jurisdiction in Regulation 1215/2012
94
. Therefore, if 
such a data subject files a lawsuit against a controller/processor for an injunction or damages, he will 
be able to choose whether to sue either in the place of the domicile of the defendant (i.e. establishment 
of the controller/processor) or in the place of his own domicile
95
, whereas the other contracting party 
will be able to file a lawsuit against the data subject only in the place of the domicile of the latter
96
.  
Finally, it is important to address the issue of the link between the rules on applicable law and the 
rules on jurisdiction with regard to consumer law and with regard to data protection law. Regarding 
consumer protection, the currently applicable rules of European private international law in principle 
lead to a result according to which a court that would have jurisdiction regarding certain matter would 
also apply its own domestic law.
97
 Therefore, the area of consumer protection is, in principle, one of 
the rare areas with parallelism between the rules on applicable law and jurisdiction. In data protection 
law, however, rules on jurisdiction and on applicable law can lead to different results. This means that, 
in practice, the consumer (data subject) will be able to sue the controller/processor in the Member 
State of his domicile, but the law with which this controller/processor will have to comply when 
processing data – determined according to Article 4 of the Data Protection Directive – will (most 
probably) not be the law of that Member State, which can lead to a lower level of consumer protection 
in the field of data protection than in other fields of law. The field of data protection therefore does not 
lead to parallelism
98
 between jurisdiction and applicable law.  
3.2.2.2 Difficulties regarding prorogation of jurisdiction in consumer contracts  
In practice, the general terms of use of most companies providing services and selling goods online – 
companies that also process data and can hence be qualified as data controllers/processors – most 
frequently contain a contractual clause allocating jurisdiction to the courts in the place of 
establishment of the company.
99
 Despite the fact that this seems to be a common practice as regards 
online contracts of companies operating on the internet, it is submitted that such a prorogation of 
                                                     
93
 See Case C-218/12, Emrek, [2013] not yet published in ECR, para 32.  
94
 See Section 4 of Regulation 1215/2012.  
95
 In application of Article 18(1) of Regulation 1215/2012.  
96
 In application of Article 18(2) of Regulation 1215/2012.  
97
 See Recital 24 of the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L 177/6. According to this recital, the “concept of 
directed activity” should be “interpreted harmoniously” in Regulation 44/2001 (now Regulation 1215/2012) and in 
Regulation Rome I.  
98
 See more regarding this in point 0. of this article.  
99
 See, for example, clause 18.9 of the “Skype Terms of Use”, according to which “[t]hese Terms […] shall be governed by 
and interpreted in accordance with the laws of Luxembourg and shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
district of Luxembourg. […]” It can be understood from the point 15 of these Terms of Use that the Skype Privacy Policy 
forms an integral part of the Terms of Use. For the complete Skype Terms of Use, see 
http://www.skype.com/en/legal/tou/#16 [Accessed 26 February 2015]. Interestingly, the “Conditions of Use & Sale” of 
Amazon.co.uk stipulate what would have been the result of determining consumer jurisdiction pursuant to Regulation 
1215/2012, by giving the consumer the choice between filing a suit in the place of his domicile or in the place of the 
subsidiary of the American company in Europe (Luxembourg): “These conditions are governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg […]. We both agree to submit to the non-exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts of the district of Luxembourg City, which means that you may bring a claim to enforce your 
consumer protection rights in connection with these Conditions of Use in Luxembourg or in the EU country in which you 
live.” See http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=1040616 [Accessed 26 February 2015].  
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jurisdiction in consumer contracts could be problematic under the current EU rules. Two lines of 
reasoning speak against such a prorogation of jurisdiction.  
On the one hand, such a clause in a consumer contract, stipulating jurisdiction in favour of the 
place of establishment of the internet company, can be considered as an unfair term in consumer 
contract pursuant to the Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts
100
 due to the fact that, 
not having been individually negotiated, ‘it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer’101. As confirmed by the CJEU 
in the case Océano Grupo
102
, such a jurisdictional clause, included in a consumer contract, that was 
not individually negotiated and that establishes an exclusive jurisdiction in the place of establishment 
of the seller, is to be regarded as unfair within the meaning of Directive 93/13 if it causes a significant 
imbalance between the parties
103
. In practice, this means that such a contractual clause is not binding 
on the consumer and that the contract in itself is binding only if it can exist without the unfair term.
104
 
It is rather evident that the consumer contract will be able to exist without such a jurisdictional clause, 
thus making only this clause non-binding for consumer. For data subject this means that he can rely on 
another jurisdictional base, either the one for consumer jurisdiction, contractual jurisdiction or the 
general rule of the domicile of the defendant.  
On the other hand, such a prorogation of jurisdiction would also not be in accordance with the 
provisions of Regulation 1215/2012. According to Article 19 of Regulation 1215/2012
105
, a 
prorogation of jurisdiction in consumer contracts is possible after the dispute has arisen
106
 – which is 
generally not the case for such general terms of use. Such a prorogation is possible also if the 
consumer is given the possibility of additional fora to bring his claim and does therefore not deprive 
him from the choice between the jurisdiction of the courts of his domicile and the domicile of the 
defendant
107
 – which is normally also not the case of the general terms of use by virtue of which the 
controller/processor tries to bring the claim to the Member State of its establishment. Hence, a 
jurisdictional agreement that is contrary to these special jurisdictional clauses for consumers does not 
have any legal force
108
 and hence does not bind the data subject. The only possibility when such an 
agreement could potentially be in accordance with Regulation 1215/2012 is if both the consumer and 
the defendant are domiciled in the same Member State and the parties prorogate jurisdiction of these 
courts, under the condition that such an agreement does not infringe the law of that Member State
109
. 
In such a case, however, prorogation of jurisdiction is not even necessary, as the consumer will be able 
                                                     
100
 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L 95/29.  
101
 Article 3(1) of the Directive 93/13.  
102
 Case C-240/98, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, [2000] ECR I-4941. The CJEU confirmed in further case-
law that the “national court must investigate of its own motion whether a term conferring exclusive territorial jurisdiction 
in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer falls within the scope of Directive 93/13 and, if it 
does, assess of its own motion whether such a term is unfair”; see, in this regard, Case C-618/10, Banco Español de 
Crédito, [2012], not yet published in ERC, para 44; and Case C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing, [2010] ERC I-10847, para 
56.  
103
 Case C-240/98, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, [2000] ECR I-4941, para 24.  
104
 See Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13.  
105
 It seems that, in the field of consumer contracts, Article 19 of Regulation 1215/2012 ab initio excludes the application 
general rule on prorogation of jurisdiction, namely its Article 25.  
106
 See Article 19(1) of Regulation 1215/2012.  
107
 See Article 19(2) of Regulation 1215/2012.  
108
 See Article 25(4) of Regulation 1215/2012. In the doctrine, see in this regard A. Staudinger, in T. Rauscher (ed.), 
Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR/EuIPR. Kommentar. Brüssel I-VO. LugÜbk 2007 (Munich: 
sellier, 2011), 408.  
109
 See Article 19(3) of Regulation 1215/2012.  
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to sue in the Member State of his domicile already on the basis of jurisdictional rules for consumers 
from the regulation itself.  
Therefore, European data subjects that can also be qualified as consumers will be able to invoke 
that they are not bound by clauses which prorogate jurisdiction and will be able to avail themselves of 
more beneficial rules on consumer jurisdiction.  
3.2.3 Non-consumer jurisdiction: contracts  
In all cases where the data subject cannot be qualified as a consumer, but nevertheless concludes a 
contract with the controller/processor, the general contract jurisdiction – vesting jurisdiction in the 
courts of the place of performance of the obligation in question
110
 – will be applicable. Jurisdiction 
will depend, however, on the question whether the contract in question is a contract for the sale of 
goods
111
 or the provision of services
112
. In the former case, the data subject will be able to sue in the 
place where the goods were delivered or should have been delivered
113
 whereas in the latter, the place 
where the services were provided or should have been provided
114
, will be pertinent to determine 
jurisdiction. If the contract cannot be fitted into any of those two categories, the place of performance 
of the obligation in question
115
 will have to be determined according to the Tessili
116
 case-law, 
confirmed, in the framework of Regulation 1215/2012 (at the time of deciding the case still Regulation 
No 44/2001), by the Falco Privatstiftung and Rabitsch
117
 case. According to this case-law, the national 
court will have to determine in three steps whether it has jurisdiction: it first has to identify the 
contractual obligation that is the subject of the dispute between the contractual parties; secondly, on 
the basis of the private international law of its Member State, it has to determine the substantive law 
applicable to the contract (lex causae); and thirdly, it has to identify, on the basis of this lex causae, 
the place of performance of the contractual obligation in question.
118
  
While for the place of performance of a contract for the sale of goods it does in principle not make 
a difference whether the contract is concluded by traditional means or online, this issue can be 
problematic in case of delivery of digitised products
119
 such as software
120
 or e-books
121
. A preliminary 
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 See Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation 1215/2012.  
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 See Article 7(1)(b), first alinea, of Regulation 1215/2012. 
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 See Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 1215/2012.  
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 Case 12/76, Industrie Tessili Italiana v Dunlop AG, [1976] ECR 1473.  
117
 Case C-533/07, Falco Privatstiftung and Rabitsch, [2009] ECR I-3327. 
118
 See the opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Case C-533/07, Falco Privatstiftung and Rabitsch, [2009] ECR 
I-3327, para 81.  
119
 A good definition of digitised products is provided by D. J. B. Svantesson, Private International law and the Internet 
(Hague: Kluwer, 2012), 432, who defines a digitised product as “a product that has been transformed from a physically 
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 The issue of software is relevant also within the framework Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs [2009] OJ L 111/16, interpreted by the CJEU in 
the Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH [2012] published in the electronic Reports of Cases.  
121
 Compare also F. F. Wang “Obstacles and Solutions to Internet Jurisdiction: A Comparative Analysis of the EU and US 
laws” (2008) 3 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 235, 237. 
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question that should be asked in this regard is whether those items constitute ‘goods’122 for the purpose 
of determining jurisdiction. The theory considers that this is not the case because they are not 
considered to be corporal objects, thus making applicable Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation 1215/2012 
rather than 7(1)(b).
123
 In practice, this means that the place of performance of such a contract will be 
determined on the basis of national law that is applicable to the contract (lex causae). In the literature, 
it is argued that the place of performance can be either at the ‘place of dispatch and receipt’ or, 
alternatively, at the place of the connecting factor either with the seller or with the buyer.
124
 National 
law does not therefore seem to be more suited for the determination of the place of performance than 
European law. 
Moreover, it is even more difficult to determine the place of performance of the contractual 
obligation for services offered online. The main issue regarding the place of performance is the 
question whether it is the activity (e.g. uploading the content online) or the result of that activity (e.g. 
downloading of the content by service recipient) that should be pertinent.
125
 The doctrine points out 
that it is the activity that should be relevant.
126
 Another alternative is to locate the place of 
performance at the place of business of the service provider, but it is submitted that such an approach 
would put too little emphasis on the actual service performed and too much emphasis on the person 
actually performing the service. Therefore, it is probably more sensible to locate it in the place of the 
recipient of a service.
 127
 
However, it is questionable whether, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction for claims alleging 
the breach of data protection rules, it should really be relevant whether the background contract is a 
contract for the sale of goods, for the provision of services or any other type of contract. Data 
protection standards are not a contractual issue that can be freely negotiated between the parties
128
 and 
the breach of data protection rules would not necessarily amount to a breach of contract. Thus, it 
seems somewhat difficult to justify why jurisdiction in this matter should depend on the type of the 
contract at stake. It would therefore seem more appropriate to create a special jurisdictional forum for 
data protection, vesting jurisdiction either in the courts of the place where the data subject has his 
habitual residence or the place where the data is processed which would mostly amount to the place of 
establishment of the controller/processor.
129
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3.2.4 Non-consumer jurisdiction: torts  
For all non-contractual claims regarding data protection, the tort jurisdiction from Article 7(2) of 
Regulation 1215/2012 will be relevant, mostly when the data subject will file an action against the 
controller/processor for damage from wrongful processing of his personal data (for example, if data 
were made public without his consent) or request an injunction to remove his personal data from the 
internet.
130
 In such cases, the Regulation vests competence in the courts of the ‘place where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur’. It is submitted that the judgment in eDate Advertising131 – 
where the CJEU judged on the issue of jurisdiction in case of infringement of personality rights with 
the content placed online on an internet website – can be applied per analogy to the field of data 
protection
132
. This leads to a result according to which the ‘place where the harmful event occurred or 
may occur’ can mean one of the three possibilities of jurisdiction: either the jurisdiction of the courts 
of establishment of the controller/processor, the courts of the centre of interests
133
 of the data subject 
or, according to the ‘mosaic theory’, for damage caused in the territory of a particular Member State, 
the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content placed online is or has been 
accessible.
134
  
Tort jurisdiction can be problematic in cases of claims brought in parallel by several data subjects 
against a data controller/processor for the same type of breach, notably because data subjects can have 
their centre of interests in different Member States and the damage can arise in different Member 
States. This can result in parallel proceedings which can, in turn, lead to irreconcilable judgments by 
different national courts.
135
 Regulation 1215/2012 does not contain express rules on jurisdiction 
concerning regrouping of such claims brought by different claimants, but only rules allowing a court 
of one Member State to decline its jurisdiction and stay proceedings, either in case of the same cause 
of action between the same parties
136
 or in case of related actions
137
. However, if courts in different 
Member States decline their jurisdiction in favour of a court in one Member State (in favour of the 
court that was seized first), a question that can be raised is whether this would not, de facto, create a 
collective action in favour of such a data subject – a remedy that is currently not yet in place in EU 
law.
138
  
                                                     
130
 The general theory on tort jurisdiction raises also the issue whether this type of jurisdiction can be used for unjustified 
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3.3 The proposed Data Protection Regulation  
In 2012, the European Commission proposed a new Data Protection Regulation
139
 that is intended to 
replace the current Data Protection Directive due to its overly fragmented EU data protection regime 
and due to the inappropriateness of the current regime from the perspective of the development of new 
technologies.
140
 While some of the changes that the proposed Regulation brings about have been 
welcomed (such as strengthened definition of ‘data subject’141 and increase of rights of individuals142, 
introduction of data protection-specific rights
143
, one-stop shop
144
, introduction of mechanisms to 
harmonise administrative practice
145
 and abolishing the registration requirement
146
), its other 
characteristics have been criticised (e.g. maintaining the distinction between ‘controller’ and 
‘processor’147, absence of a strong supervisory authority at the European level148, introducing the right 
to be forgotten
149
 and the costs for companies linked to hiring a Data Protection Officer
150
).  
In addition to these issues, the Data Protection Regulation also aims to clarify the issue of remedies 
in the field of data protection.
151
 The proposed Data Protection Regulation not only regulates judicial 
remedies against a supervisory authority (Article 74) and direct judicial remedies against a controller 
or processor (Article 75), but also includes specific rules on the right of compensation (Article 77) and 
common rules for court proceedings (Article 76). These remedies also open a question of jurisdiction 
and applicable law in case the data subject wants to effectively use them. Since the remedies can be 
directed both against a supervisory authority as well as directly against the controller or processor, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the administrative path of data protection enforcement and the civil 
path of this enforcement.  
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3.3.1 Jurisdiction in administrative and civil litigation path  
The distinction between the administrative litigation path and the civil litigation path in the proposed 
Data Protection Regulation can be inferred from the allocation of jurisdiction to a certain court for 
certain types of remedies pursuant to Regulation. According to Article 74(3) of this regulation, 
proceedings against a supervisory authority – and hence against an administrative decision – ‘shall be 
brought before the courts of the Member State where the supervisory authority is established’. For an 
administrative litigation path, jurisdiction is therefore, logically, vested in the courts of the Member 
State of the administrative authority.
152
 It is rather evident that the jurisdictional issues covered by 
Article 74 of the proposed regulation fall outside ‘civil and commercial matters’ as defined by 
Regulation 1215/2012. In fact, this article regulates jurisdiction for proceedings against a supervisory 
authority if this authority fails to act in order to protect the rights of the data subject.
153
 The 
supervisory authority acting as a defendant is a public authority that is supposed to act in the exercise 
of its public powers. Therefore, this litigation will not covered by the scope of application of 
Regulation 1215/2012.  
With regard to the civil litigation path, Article 75(2) of the proposed Data Protection Regulation 
contains a specific jurisdictional clause, vesting jurisdiction in the courts ‘of the Member State where 
the controller or processor has an establishment’ or, alternatively, in the courts ‘of the Member State 
where the data subject has its habitual residence’ except for the cases where ‘the controller is a public 
authority acting in the exercise of its public powers’. Despite the fact that it seems that the latter 
phrase seems to follow the CJEU case-law on the scope of application ratione materiae of Regulation 
1215/2012, it is submitted that Article 75 of the proposed Data Protection Regulation can be attributed 
a somewhat different scope of application than Regulation 1215/2012. In fact, it is not entirely clear 
whether Article 75 – preventing the data subject to bring proceedings before the courts of his habitual 
residence if the controller is public authority acting in the exercise of its public powers – is to be 
understood in the sense that jurisdiction is then determined by the first sentence of that provision (i.e. 
establishment of controller/processor) or in the sense that such a case is not covered by that provision 
at all and the jurisdiction is determined according to the national rules of private international law. 
Even though the practical outcome might be the same – leading to the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Member State where the public authority is located – the first reading of the provision would go much 
further than Regulation 1215/2012, as it would cover matters that do not fall within the definition of 
‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of this regulation.  
For that reason – and for the reason of systematically regulating all jurisdictional issues in one legal 
act – it would seem more appropriate not to include this jurisdictional clause in the future Data 
Protection Regulation, but rather in Regulation 1215/2012. That way it could also be ensured that this 
jurisdictional clause does not come in conflict with other heads of jurisdiction provided by the latter 
legal act.  
Moreover, specifically with regard to Article 75(2) of the proposed Data Protection Regulation, it is 
to be noted that this provision properly takes into account particular vulnerability of a data subject by 
allowing him to file a claim in the Member State of his habitual residence and by de-coupling 
jurisdiction in data protection from a specific type of contract. Hence, a particular consumer 
jurisdiction in data protection matters does not seem necessary. This jurisdictional clause does, 
however, not address several important issues.  
The first is the possibility of collective claims. The importance of jurisdictional issues for collective 
claims in data protection litigation should not be underestimated, in particular because certain Member 
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States already allow for such a possibility
154
 and because the EU is striving to regulate that matter
155
. 
Collective claims can be relevant in particular in case of systematic and large-scale violations of the 
rights of data subjects (for example, in case of the unlawful transfer of data to third countries).
156
 It is 
true that the proposed Data Protection Regulation allows a court in one Member State to suspend 
proceedings in case of parallel proceedings in another Member State (Article 76(3) and (4)), but this 
provision does not directly deal with jurisdiction in collective claims. Moreover, it is not entirely clear 
whether ‘parallel proceedings’ encompass only proceedings between the same parties or also related 
proceedings between the same controller/processor and different data subjects.  
Second, Article 75(2) does not address the (im)possibility of prorogation of jurisdiction in data 
protection matters. Hence, for reasons explained above
157
, the article should contain a clear paragraph 
stating that such a prorogation of jurisdiction is not possible.  
Third, it is unclear whether the personal jurisdiction in this article (habitual residence of the data 
subject) should be coupled with a criterion of ‘targeting’ of controller’s activities towards the Member 
State of the domicile of data subject, in a similar way as in the context of E-commerce
158
 and torts 
against personality rights committed over the internet
159
. The targeting test seeks to determine whether 
a certain website favoured the country of the forum
160
. This would mean that such a test would not 
only be used to determine consumer jurisdiction (‘directing’ of activities pursuant to Article 17(1)(c) 
of Regulation 1215/2012), but in principle internet-related jurisdiction in general
161
. It is debatable 
whether the CJEU in Google Spain and Google considered the criterion of ‘directing’ of activities as 
relevant when determining the territorial application of the Data Protection Directive
162
. On the one 
hand, it is true that the CJEU considered that ‘processing of personal data is carried out in the context 
of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of a Member State…which 
orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that Member State’.163 On the other hand, however, 
this ‘orientating’ did not concern directing of activities of a controller/processor from one Member 
State to another, but directing of activities to the Member State of establishment of the subsidiary of 
the controller. Therefore, this criterion is different from that of ‘targeting’ or ‘orientating’ as used in 
other legislative instruments. Regarding the question whether the jurisdictional clause should contain 
the criterion of ‘targeting’, it is submitted that such a clause should indeed be added as a criterion for 
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establishing jurisdiction for data protection claims, not only because this criterion would prevent 
potential exorbitant jurisdiction
164
, but also because – through the application of this criterion – the 
jurisdictional rules could potentially be more aligned with the rules on applicable law
165
.  
Fourth, Article 75(2) of the proposed Data Protection Regulation does not deal with the 
relationship to other provisions of Regulation 1215/2012, in particular to its clauses on exclusive 
jurisdiction. Suppose that the data subject’s data was wrongly processed during the entry of this data 
into a public register and he wants to challenge this, relying on Article 24(3) of Regulation 1215/2012 
which gives jurisdiction to the courts of the Member State in which the register is kept. In such a case, 
does a data subject still have the right to file an action for compensation for wrongful processing of his 
data in the Member State of his habitual residence pursuant to Article 75(2) of the proposed Data 
Protection Regulation? What if the data subject concludes a contract of sale to buy a house in Member 
State A and his data is processed wrongly
166
 in this context by the real estate agent established in 
Member State B? Which jurisdictional clause should be applicable in such a case? One possibility is to 
argue that the claims relating to the wrongful processing of data should be separated from other claims 
relating to exclusive jurisdiction, meaning that the data subject retains the right to file a claim in the 
Member State of his habitual residence. However, it is also possible to argue that, in case of several 
claims stemming from the same contract whereby some of claims give rise to exclusive jurisdiction 
and some of them do not (such as processing of data), the data subject should have the right to file all 
claims before the court having exclusive jurisdiction.  
3.3.2 Enforcement of judgments in the field of data protection  
As regards the possibility of enforcement of judgments issued in the field of data protection, both 
Article 74(5) and Article 75(4) of the proposed Data Protection Regulation seem to be lex specialis 
with regard to enforcement provisions of Regulation 1215/2012. In fact, these two provisions require 
enforcement of a judicial decision without following the general rules on enforceability laid down in 
Regulation 1215/2012. Despite the fact that the previously valid system of declaration of 
enforceability
167
 is abolished in the new Regulation 1215/2012
168
, the latter still provides for certain 
procedural guarantees with regard to enforcement, such as a certificate of enforcement
169
 and certain 
grounds for refusal of enforcement
170
. From the provisions of the proposed Data Protection 
Regulation, it is not clear whether those general safeguards would apply also in the field of data 
protection, in particular since there is no reference to those general rules in the proposed Data 
Protection Regulation. It is submitted that, if Regulation 1215/2012 was to be applied by analogy, this 
would need to be specifically laid down in the proposed Data Protection Regulation. Moreover, even if 
it could be assumed that the general provisions on enforcement would be used also for the 
enforcement of judgments rendered in the area of data protection, this could not be the case if, ab 
initio, the litigation is not covered by the notion of ‘civil and commercial matters’. Therefore, such 
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broadening of the scope of application of enforcement mechanisms also raises the issue of the 
competence of the Union to regulate enforcement outside of civil and commercial matters. The legal 
base of the proposed Data Protection Regulation, namely Article 16 TFEU, does not seem to justify 
such a general jurisdictional clause.
171
  
3.4 A necessary revision of Regulation 1215/2012 
It stems from the above that the most appropriate way to deal with the jurisdictional issues in the field 
of data protection would be to include a special provision for this field in Regulation 1215/2012. A 
relevant article of Regulation 1215/2012 could be drafted in the following manner:  
 
Section 5a: Jurisdiction in matters relating to data protection 
Article 23a 
1. In matters relating to data protection, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section if the data is 
processed either on the basis of a contract concluded between a data subject and a controller or 
processor or, in the absence of such a contract, directly on the basis of applicable data protection 
legislation.  
2. A data subject and an authority or an association representing that data subject may bring 
proceedings against a controller or processor processing data relating to this data subject either in 
the courts of the Member State in which the controller or processor is domiciled or, regardless of 
the domicile of controller or processor, in the courts for the place where the data subject is 
domiciled, provided that the controller or processor directs its activities to the Member State of 
domicile of data subject or to several States including that Member State.  
3. Proceedings may be brought against a data subject by a controller or processor only in the courts 
of the Member State in which the data subject is domiciled.  
4. Prorogation of jurisdiction between a data subject on the one hand and controller or processor on 
the other hand is possible only under the conditions set out in Article 23b.  
 
Article 23b 
 
The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement: 
1. which is entered into after the dispute has arisen; 
2. which allows the data subject to bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in this 
Section; or 
3. which is entered into by the data subject and the other party to the contract, both of whom are at 
the time of conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same Member State, 
and which confers jurisdiction on the courts of that Member State, provided that such an 
agreement is not contrary to the law of that Member State. 
Moreover, once the European legal order allows for collective claims of data subjects, Regulation 
1215/2012 will also need to provide for rules regarding a jurisdictional basis for such collective 
                                                     
171
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claims.
172
 The European legislator will therefore hopefully re-think the strategy and include a special 
jurisdictional clause in this regulation rather than in the proposed Data Protection Regulation. 
Regulating jurisdiction is however not the only issue that needs to be addressed and thought through 
with regard to data protection. Another issue is the one of applicable law which is discussed below.  
4. Applicable law173 
4.1 The myth of parallelism between jurisdiction and applicable law 
In principle, the substantive scope and the concepts contained in regulations determining applicable 
law
174
 (Rome I
175
 and Rome II
176
) should be interpreted consistently with those in Regulation 
1215/2012.
177
 The reason for this parallelism in interpretation stems from a common objective of both 
sets of legal rules which is to prevent forum shopping.
178
 A closer reading of both sets of provisions 
shows that, with regard to certain concepts, parallel interpretation of certain concepts is even expressly 
required.
179
 Such parallel interpretation could often lead the competent court to apply its own rules 
which would significantly facilitate its decision making.
180
  
Although it is, in principle, desirable that the court deciding the claim also applies its own law, 
notably due to procedural economy
181
, this is not always the case in practice. If one compares, for 
example, the rules on jurisdiction and applicable law in the field of contracts, they can amount to a 
different result with regard to applicable law and jurisdiction.
182
 While jurisdictional rules use as a 
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connecting factor ‘the place of performance of the obligation in question’183, the rules on applicable 
law point to the applicability of the law of ‘habitual residence’ of the seller or the service provider184 
which is not necessarily the same as the place of performance of contractual obligation.  
Similarly, in the field of torts, it is possible to come to the conclusion that such a parallelism is, at 
best, only partial
185
. The general rule for determining applicable law for torts is the place where the 
damage occurred
186
, whereas the main connecting element for determining jurisdiction in delictual 
matters is the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur
187
. It is true, however, that the 
case-law brought the content of the latter notion closer to the content of the former; in fact, in Bier v 
Mines de Potasse d'Alsace
188
 and subsequent case-law
189
, the CJEU confirmed that the notion of 
‘harmful event’ from Article 5(3) of Regulation 44/2001 (now Article 7(2) of Regulation 1215/2012) 
covers ‘both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it’. In 
consequence, with regard to torts, the rules on jurisdiction and applicable law can potentially amount 
to the same result, although this is not necessarily the case.  
Moreover, it is important to stress another difference between rules on jurisdiction and applicable 
law. The general regulations governing applicable law (Rome I and Rome II Regulations) have 
universal application, meaning that the law to which one of these regulation points to is applied 
regardless of whether it is the law of one of the Member States or not
190
. In consequence, neither the 
fact that the conflict-of-law rules point to the law of a Member State nor the fact that the claimants are 
domiciled in one of the Member States plays a role in the application of these regulations. To the 
contrary, Regulation 1215/2012 applies, pursuant to its Article 4(1), only to ‘persons domiciled in a 
Member State’, regardless of their nationality, and hence does not have universal application.  
4.2 No room for Rome I and II Regulations in data protection matters?  
The current doctrine dealing with issues of applicable law in the framework of data protection within 
the EU bases its analysis mostly – or even solely – on Article 4 of Data Protection Directive191, 
without first addressing the issue of the relationship between the Rome I and II Regulations on the one 
hand and the Data Protection Directive on the other hand. However, in particular with regard to the 
issue of agreements on applicable data protection law as well as in the field of consumer protection, 
where rules on applicable law are different than with regard to general contract or tort law, it is of 
utmost importance to address the issue whether the provisions of Rome I and II Regulations bear any 
significance for the field of data protection.  
In practice, there seems to be still some confusion as to what is the legal base for determining 
applicable law in the field of data protection. Whereas the CJEU in the case Google Spain and 
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Google192 did not refer to either Rome I or II Regulations or the issue of the relationship between 
these regulations and Article 4 of the Data Protection Directive – a reasoning which would seem to 
imply that the former has to give way to the latter –, a German court in the case Facebook v 
Independent Data Protection Authority of Schleswig-Holstein
193
, on the contrary, qualified data 
protection provisions as overriding mandatory provisions within the meaning of Article 9 of Rome I 
Regulation,
194
 and thus did not entirely exclude the applicability of the latter in the field of data 
protection. While the reasoning of the CJEU can be understood from the perspective of systematic 
interpretation of data protection legislation and from the perspective of the questions posed by the 
national court to the CJEU, the reasoning of the German court can be fitted more into the fundamental 
rights perspective. It can be argued that, given the fact that data protection constitutes a fundamental 
right which is concretised through the Data Protection Directive, it is not possible to deviate from this 
fundamental right or the rules adopted for its implementation.
195
 
The analysis of the rules of both Rome regulations, as well as the relevant provisions of the Data 
Protection Directive, allow for two potential conclusions with regard to the relationship between the 
two sets of legal documents.  
The first possibility is to argue that Article 4 of the Data Protection Directive lies entirely outside 
the scope of application of both Rome I and II Regulations, thus leaving no possibility of overlap 
between their respective scopes of application or integration of the former provision into the system of 
the two regulations. In this regard, it is to be noted that both the Rome I and II Regulations expressly 
stipulate that they do not apply to ‘administrative matters’.196 The core of the analysis of applicability 
of both regulations to the field of data protection will therefore be the question whether data protection 
can fall under the notion of ‘civil matters’ within the meaning of the two regulations. Data protection 
is rather difficult to conceptualise, since it falls into ‘the grey area between public and private’197, but 
already from this argument it can be difficult to qualify it as civil law. It is therefore most likely that it 
will be excluded from the scope of application of the two regulations already on this basis. 
In addition, Rome II Regulation expressly excludes from its scope ‘non-contractual obligations 
arising out of violations of privacy’198. In this regard, it is not entirely clear whether, for the purposes 
of Rome II Regulation, violations of privacy include also violations of data protection, notably due to 
the fact that neither the textual nor historical
199
 interpretation of this provision seem to include data 
protection issues in its scope. It can, however, be reasonably assumed that this is the case
200
. Such an 
interpretation would be based on reasoning that data protection forms an integral part of privacy and 
that rules regarding data protection are covered by the rules on protection of privacy. This approach 
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would also be consistent with the approach taken in the Data Protection Directive which itself uses the 
term the ‘right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data’201. Moreover, the CJEU, 
which repeatedly used this term in its case-law,
202
 very often considers both rights together
203
. Even in 
the recent Google Spain judgment, the CJEU referred both to the right to privacy and the right to 
protection of personal data
204
, which is an indication that the two rights are inextricably intertwined. 
This would seem to suggest that not only the issues of privacy, but also the issues relating to data 
protection are excluded from the scope of application of the Rome II Regulation.
205
  
However, the question remains whether such reasoning would not render the provisions (and the 
fundamental right) on data protection redundant. As argued in the doctrine – and confirmed by the 
circumstance that these two are distinct fundamental rights in the Charter – privacy has to be 
distinguished from data protection at least to a certain extent.
206
 While these two rights certainly 
partially overlap, privacy seems to be a broader concept that encompasses also other issues than just 
personal data; on the other hand, not all personal data necessarily fall into the sphere of privacy.
207
  
The second possibility is to see the two sets of legal sources (Rome I/Rome II Regulations and 
Data Protection Directive) as being in a lex generalis – lex specialis relationship. Both Rome I and 
Rome II Regulations allow for the inclusion of conflict-of-law rules with regard to ‘particular matters’ 
into other EU law instruments. As it stems from Article 23 of Rome I Regulation and Article 27 of 
Rome II Regulation
208
, such conflict-of-law rules relating to particular matters shall not be prejudiced 
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by either of these regulations, thereby expressly allowing for lex specialis conflict-of-law provisions. 
It can be argued that Article 4 of the Data Protection Directive is such a special provision.  
The argument of lex specialis seems to imply, however, that Article 4 of the Data Protection 
Directive cannot be placed entirely outside of the system of Rome I and II Regulations. Whereas 
Article 4 could potentially be a lex specialis with regard to the general or specific rules on applicable 
law in these regulations
209
, it is not entirely clear whether this is also the case with regard to the 
provisions on freedom of choice
210
 or regarding the overriding mandatory provisions
211
. Does Article 4 
of the Data Protection Directive preclude the possibility of parties agreeing on applicable law in the 
field of data protection? Can the provisions on consumer protection be seen as the overriding 
mandatory provisions that can prevail in the case of data protection? Or can data protection provisions 
themselves be seen as such as overriding mandatory provisions? These are the issues discussed below.  
4.3 The controversy around agreements on applicable data protection law  
The current doctrine and practice
212
 is divided regarding the question whether the parties to a contract 
can freely choose data protection law that is applicable in a framework of this contract.
213
 While 
certain authors advocate the thesis that the parties to a contract have the freedom to make such a 
choice
214, others are of the opinion that Member States’ data protection laws should be qualified as 
overriding mandatory provisions that do not allow for an agreement on applicable law between the 
parties
215
.  
The German case Facebook v Independent Data Protection Authority of Schleswig-Holstein
216
 is an 
example in this regard. Despite the fact that the case has been decided by an administrative court in a 
dispute between a DPA and Facebook and that the content of the claim was to set aside a(n) 
(administrative) decision of a DPA, the German court still considered that the Rome I Regulation 
could be relevant. The reason for that seems to be that the relationship between Facebook and its users 
– the two contractual parties that agreed on the application of German data protection law for the 
purposes of this contract –, is in nature a civil-law relationship to which the Rome I Regulation 
applies.
217
 According to the German court, data protection law falls within the concept of overriding 
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mandatory provision within the meaning of Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation, making it impossible 
for the parties to make an agreement on applicable law in this regard.
218
 
 
According to Article 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation, overriding mandatory provisions are 
provisions that are regarded as ‘crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests’219. 
Overriding mandatory provisions
220
 are those that are applicable regardless of the law that would be 
applicable on the basis of Rome I Regulation and regardless of the law that the parties have chosen.
221
 
As it stems from the case-law of the CJEU, starting with Ingmar
222
, not only provisions of Member 
States’ law, but also provisions of EU law itself can be qualified as overriding mandatory provisions. 
In Ingmar
223
, confirmed notably by Honyvem Informazioni Commerciali
224
, Semen
225
 and Unamar
226
, 
the CJEU held that the provision of the Directive on self-employed commercial agents
227
 on the 
protection of the commercial agent after termination of the contract is mandatory in nature. Although 
not all EU law provisions have a character of overriding mandatory provisions, it can be claimed that, 
if those CJEU rulings are applied per analogy to the Data Protection Directive, its Article 4 could have 
a mandatory character. In the EU, the question of mandatory nature of data protection provisions can 
arise in two different settings: as mandatory nature of provisions stemming from EU law and of those 
stemming from Member States’ law. 
On the one hand, contractual parties might agree on the applicability of third-country law (for 
example US law), which amounts to a case containing a similar factual constellation to the one in 
Ingmar
228
. In such a case, a question of mandatory nature of Article 4 of the Data Protection Directive 
itself will arise. In order for a provision to be qualified as an overriding mandatory provision, the norm 
has to have the purpose of pursuing public interest.
229
 It has been argued in the doctrine that the public 
interest of the provisions of Data Protection Directive is demonstrated by the fact that the directive 
pursues internal market objectives by ensuring free movement of personal data.
230
 Whereas the 
adoption of legislation on the basis of the provision relating to the internal market undeniably 
demonstrates public interest of this legislation, it is not clear whether this suffices for a legal 
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instrument to contain mandatory provisions. Such reasoning would imply that all EU (civil and 
commercial) legislation based on Article 114 TFEU has, by that very fact, the nature of an overriding 
mandatory provision within the meaning of Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation. Given the fact that the 
Treaties do not provide for a specific legal base for adopting legislation in civil matters and that such 
legislation will always be based on Article 114 TFEU, it might be a bit far-reaching to treat all the 
legislation adopted on the basis of this article as mandatory within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the 
Rome I Regulation. 
Another argument in favour of designating data protection provisions as mandatory provisions 
could be the circumstance that it stems from Recital 18 of the Data Protection Directive that the 
processing of personal data in the Union ‘must be carried out in accordance with the law of one of the 
Member States’ and that the ‘processing carried out under the responsibility of a controller who is 
established in a Member State should be governed by the law of that State’231. However, these 
provisions can also be understood as an expression of binding nature of the directive rather than their 
quality as overriding mandatory provisions.  
On the other hand, a question of mandatory nature of the law of one of the Member States that 
is transposing Article 4 of the Data Protection Directive into the national legal order can be 
relevant. This would mean that it would need to be checked in the national law of each 
Member State whether data protection constitutes such overriding mandatory provisions 
within the meaning of Article 9(1) of Rome I Regulation. Such a solution means, however, 
the possibility of divergent results in different Member States.232 One can imagine that data 
protection laws have a different importance in some Member States than in others.  
4.4 De lege lata: applicable law in the Data Protection Directive  
The absence of parallelism between the rules on jurisdiction and applicable law is rather striking when 
one analyses the rules on applicable law within the framework of the Data Protection Directive. 
According to Article 4(1) of this directive, the law of a particular Member State transposing the Data 
Protection Directive applies if the controller is established in this Member State and data is processed 
in the context of its activities (subparagraph (a))
233
. If the controller does not have an establishment 
within the EU, the law of a particular Member State transposing the Data Protection Directive can 
apply either on the basis of public international law (subparagraph (b)) or if the controller makes use 
of equipment situated on the territory of this particular Member State (subparagraph (c)). These latter 
rules can therefore lead to the application of national measures transposing the directive even in case 
of absence of establishment of the controller in the EU. Quite differently, in such a situation when the 
controller is not established in the EU, the jurisdictional rules of Regulation 1215/2012 would not 
apply.
234
 This means that the jurisdiction would be determined on the basis of jurisdictional rules of 
Member States.  
Moreover, it stems from the above that – differently from the classic rules on applicable law 
enshrined in Rome I and II Regulations – Article 4 of Data Protection Directive does not have 
universal application
235
. In other words, the law that can be applicable according to the Data Protection 
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Directive can only be the law of one of the Member States and not the law of a third country. Thus, 
Article 4 of Data Protection Directive seems to have a double function. On the one hand, this article 
determines when the law of one of the Member States will be applicable as opposed to the law of a 
third country. On the other hand, this article determines the law of which Member State will be 
applicable within the European Union. 
A landmark case in the field of applicable law with regard to data protection is the Google Spain 
and Google case
236
, in which the CJEU interpreted, for the first time, Article 4(1)(a) of Data Protection 
Directive. As already mentioned, this provision requires the application of national law of a certain 
Member State transposing the directive if ‘the processing is carried out in the context of the activities 
of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State’. The CJEU, asked to 
interpret several notions from this article – notably the notion of ‘establishment’ and the question 
when such an establishment ‘processes’ personal data ‘in the context’ of its activities – came to the 
conclusion that the conditions of this article are fulfilled ‘when the operator of a search engine sets up 
in a Member State a branch or subsidiary which is intended to promote and sell advertising space 
offered by that engine and which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that Member 
State’237. Whereas this decision, following the opinion of the Advocate General Jääskinen238, might 
well be appropriate for the factual constellation specific for the Google Spain and Google case, it is 
doubtful whether, from a more general perspective, it can be the only plausible and the most 
appropriate interpretation of this provision.  
First, it is not entirely convincing that the application of data protection legislation should be 
dependent on the business model that the search engine uses to generate its revenues.
239
 It is 
questionable whether selling of advertising space is a criterion that should be taken into account at all, 
given the fact that the main (and only) criterion that the Data Protection Directive takes into account is 
the processing of personal data. It is true, however, that both activities form part of the same business 
model and that it is precisely the selling of advertising space that financially enables the activity of 
processing of personal data.  
What is however even more problematic is the question whether such an interpretation of Article 
4(1)(a) of Data Protection Directive would allow for this provision to include also search engines that 
are built upon different, non-profit, business models
240
. It seems that such search engines, that equally 
process personal data, would equally need to be covered by this provision. Such a solution does, 
however, not stem readily from the reasoning of the CJEU that affirms that the activities of Google in 
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California (operator of the search engine) and of its subsidiary in Spain (selling advertising space) are 
‘inextricably linked’ in the sense that the latter activity renders the ‘search engine at issue 
economically profitable’ and that it is therefore ‘the means enabling those activities to be 
performed’241. In the case of the absence of this link, would the conditions from Article 4(1)(a) still be 
fulfilled? It seems that this would not be the case and that such a situation could potentially be covered 
by subparagraph (c) of the same article, requiring that the controller ‘makes use of equipment’ on the 
territory of a particular Member State.  
Therefore, it is not entirely clear from the Google Spain and Google judgment whether processing 
of personal data by an operator selling advertising space is the only instance that falls under this article 
or whether this is only one of the examples that can be covered by this provision. The problem with 
former interpretation lies in the circumstance that it depends to a too high degree on a business model 
on which the search engine is built upon. In fact, such an interpretation only covers certain business 
models – more precisely, it encompasses only those search engines that use the sale of advertising 
space to finance its search activities.  
Furthermore, it is important to stress that the solution adopted by the CJEU comes curiously close 
to the one regarding the interpretation of Article 15 of Regulation No 44/2001 (now Article 17 of 
Regulation 1215/2012) in the joint cases Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof242 and the subsequent case-
law, Mühlleitner243 and Emrek244. The CJEU namely adds as one of the conditions of the application 
of Article 4(1)(a) of Data Protection Directive the circumstance that the subsidiary of the search 
engine ‘orientates’ its activity towards the inhabitants of the Member State in which it is established. It 
is true that the Working Party 29 considered the ‘targeting’ of individuals in the EU as a potential 
additional criterion when the controller does not have an establishment in the EU in order to provide 
for a sufficient link with EU territory.
245
 However, adding this criterion through an interpretation of 
Article 4(1)(a) of Data Protection Directive without a legislative revision of this provision seems 
problematic.
246
 Not only because this criterion does not appear in the text of the article itself and hence 
cannot be established on the basis of a textual interpretation of this article, but also because this 
criterion does not seem to stem either from a teleological interpretation of this provision or from the 
usual meaning from the term ‘orientating’. It seems that this element, in a way, neutralises the 
circumstance that the controller has a subsidiary in a certain Member State. While it is certainly 
possible to imagine circumstances in which a controller would have a subsidiary in a given Member 
State and not orientate its activity towards the inhabitants of this Member State, it seems that such 
examples would be rather rare in practice. It should be recalled that the criterion of ‘orientating’ of an 
activity makes most sense if there is a cross-border element to such ‘orientating’.247 A cross-border 
element is also present in the notion of ‘directing of activities’ as used by Article 17 of Regulation 
1215/2012. In any event, it would seem reasonable that this criterion is used as a subsidiary criterion 
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and not as a primary one in the framework of the interpretation of Article 4(1)(a) of the Data 
Protection Directive.  
It is true, however, that the decision of the CJEU can also be understood in the light of the 
preliminary questions asked by the national court. In fact, the answer given by the CJEU to the 
question regarding applicable law is a mirror image of one of the three possible interpretations put 
forward by the national court.
248
 It could therefore be claimed that the CJEU only affirmatively replied 
to a premise already given to it by the national court. The question was not asked in abstract, but with 
regard to a concrete situation and on the basis of the concrete description of a situation given by the 
national court.  
Another question that needs to be asked is whether the interpretation given by the CJEU would be 
the same if a company from a third country has a subsidiary in one (or several) EU Member States that 
processes personal data within the EU. In the already mentioned German case Facebook v 
Independent Data Protection Authority of Schleswig-Holstein
249
, the German administrative court of 
Schleswig-Holstein held that German law was not applicable to processing of data of its German users 
because the German subsidiary of Facebook did not actually process the data, but was only active in 
the field of marketing
250
. Since it was the Irish subsidiary of Facebook that processed personal data of 
its European users, it was the Irish law that was exclusively applicable
251
.  
It can certainly be argued that this decision of the German court is not in accordance with the CJEU 
decision in Google Spain and Google and that the circumstance that the German subsidiary of 
Facebook exercises marketing activity should be sufficient for German law to be applicable. Such 
reasoning, however, seems to entirely disregard different functions of the two European subsidiaries of 
Facebook (German and Irish). However, an inverse reasoning (such as the one by the German court) 
leads to determination of applicable law according to different criteria depending on whether a 
company from a third country has a subsidiary in the EU that processes personal data of its EU users. 
For such a company, it would be enough to have a marketing subsidiary in one of the EU Member 
States for the law of this state to apply, whereas, in case of its EU subsidiary processing personal data, 
this would not suffice. It therefore seems that, after Google Spain and Google, the German Facebook 
case would be decided differently. It could be argued, however, that an EU subsidiary that processes 
personal data is actually an establishment within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of the Data Protection 
Directive and that the law of this Member State should be applicable to this establishment.
252 
4.5 De lege ferenda: territorial application of the proposed Data Protection Regulation 
The proposed Data Protection Regulation no longer contains a conflict-of-laws provision determining 
the applicable law of a particular Member State to the processing of personal data, since the regulation 
itself unifies the legal regime on processing of data. Therefore, after the entry into force of the 
regulation, the issues regarding applicable law will hardly be relevant. However, in two instances such 
issues might nevertheless arise despite the entry into force of the regulation. On the one hand, 
questions of applicable law might be relevant if the Member States, despite the regulation, maintain in 
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force divergent provisions on issues not addressed in detail by the regulation.
253
 On the other hand, 
such questions might be relevant regarding the (im)possibility to enter into an agreement on applicable 
law for data protection. After the entry into force of the regulation, such agreements will most 
probably not be allowed, as the parties to a contract cannot deviate from a legal instrument such as 
regulation. This would be contrary to the binding effect of the regulation and would go against its 
nature as a legal instrument of unification of the law throughout the entire Union.  
The proposed Data Protection Regulation does, however, contain a provision determining its 
territorial scope of application. Similarly as the current Data Protection Directive, the proposed 
regulation distinguishes between situations where the controller is established in the EU and where it 
is not. If the controller has an establishment in the EU, the regulation applies, according to its Article 
3(1), ‘to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a 
controller or a processor in the Union’. It can be seen that the rule for the territorial application of EU 
data protection legislation remained the same: processing of data in the context of the activities of a 
controller or processor, established in the Union. Therefore, the legal issues with regard to the 
interpretation of this provision also remained the same, in particular the meaning of the phrase ‘in the 
context of the activities’ and ‘establishment’. Therefore, the reasoning of the CJEU in the case Google 
Spain will be pertinent also after the entry into force of the regulation.  
The second and the third paragraph of Article 3 of the proposed Data Protection Regulation deal 
with the situation in which the controller does not have an establishment in the Union. Such a 
controller has to comply with the rules established in the regulation if his activities relate to the 
offering of goods or services to data subjects in the Union
254
. In practice this means that all the online 
stores based in the US and not having a subsidiary in the Union will have to comply with the European 
data protection legislation when they offer goods or services online to European data subjects
255
. A 
very extensive reading of this provision could even lead to an interpretation according to which the 
Union legislation on data protection would apply even if a European data subject buys goods or 
receives services physically in the territory of a third state and not online. Such an interpretation would 
however lead to a too extensive extraterritorial application of Union legislation on the territory of a 
third state and cannot be upheld.
256
 
Furthermore, the proposed Data Protection Regulation on data protection will apply also if the 
activities of the controller not established in the Union relate to the monitoring of the behaviour of 
data subjects in the Union
257
. The explanatory memorandum to the regulation does not specify how 
broad this provision should be interpreted. On a more narrow interpretation, this provision would 
cover monitoring of behaviour by companies established in third countries (such as Google or 
Facebook), in order, for example, to use the gathered information for commercial purposes, such as 
targeted advertising. On a rather broad interpretation, it could also be argued that even the NSA, when 
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processing data of Union citizens or obtained from Union authorities, has to respect Union law. 
Although this is, admittedly, an extremely broad interpretation of this article, nothing in the text of the 
article or the explanatory memorandum seems to limit such an application ratione personae of this 
article. One could stretch this interpretation even further and ask a question whether this would also 
mean that the US authorities have to observe Union law when a Union citizen travels to the US and 
gives his fingerprints on the US border. Such an interpretation, however, seems to be rather far-
reaching, in particular because it would lead to a rather broad extraterritorial application of the EU 
data protection legislation.  
Finally, the third paragraph of Article 3 of the proposed Data Protection Regulation is, again, 
comparable to the rule set out in the current Article 4(1)(b) of the Data Protection Directive, since both 
legal instruments provide for the applicability of, respectively, Union and Member State’s law, in case 
where the national law of a Member State “applies by virtue of public international law”.  
5. Conclusion  
In addition to public enforcement of data protection law by the national DPAs, private enforcement 
directly by data subjects before the civil courts will undoubtedly increase in the future, notably if data 
subjects become more aware of their rights. The regulation of jurisdiction and applicable law can have 
an important influence on the rights of data subjects in the Union. Too complicated jurisdictional and 
conflict-of-law rules can dissuade data subjects from effectively exercising their rights.  
On the basis of the analysis in this article, the following conclusions can be made. First, with 
regard to jurisdictional issues, it can be concluded that data subjects are – in an analogous 
way as consumers – a weaker party in comparison with controllers/processors. For that 
reason, special jurisdictional rules need to be developed that would suit the needs of data 
subjects and respond to specificities of the field of data protection. In order to achieve 
coherence between jurisdictional rules in the field of data protection and other jurisdictional 
rules, it would be most appropriate to include these specific rules directly into Regulation 
1215/2012 and not in the proposed Data Protection Regulation. Consequently, the proposed 
Data Protection Regulation would need to be amended and not deal with this specific matter. 
In addition, in order to effectively protect the rights of data subjects, EU legislation would 
also need to put more emphasis on collective and representative claims and, consequently, 
regulate jurisdictional rules in this regard.  
Moreover, rules concerning applicable law in the field of data protection would need to be 
clarified. On the one hand, the question of relationship between the ‘classic’ conflict-of-law rules 
(Rome I and II Regulations) and the provisions of the Data Protection Directive should be clearer, 
notably the question whether data protection can constitute overriding mandatory provisions from 
which no deviation is possible. Given the nature of data protection as a fundamental right, it seems 
indeed preferable that it also qualifies as an overriding mandatory rule. Furthermore, the rules on 
territorial scope of the proposed Data Protection Regulation should be amended so as to prevent its 
broad extraterritorial or even universal application.  
Therefore, on a worldwide level and for the future, it will need to be considered whether the rules 
on jurisdiction and applicable law in the field of data protection can be agreed upon on a global scale, 
perhaps in a form of an international treaty
258
. Some time ago, an idea of a separate international 
                                                     
258
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law, in a document Cross-Border Data Flows and Protection of Privacy 
(2010), available on http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2010pd13e.pdf [Accessed 27 February 2015], para. 22-23, 
stressed that there is ‘no system in place to address fundamental cross-border issues from a global private international 
law perspective’, and that there is ‘the need to co-ordinate work in this area’. A comparable idea on a multilateral 
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tribunal for resolving Internet-related issues has been raised in the literature
259
. An even further step 
would be to attempt to align, on a global level, data protection rules that currently vary heavily among 
different countries in the world, but it is highly questionable whether this is politically feasible.
260
 It is 
also to be seen whether, for data protection litigation, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements
261
, which is however not yet in force
262
, could potentially be relevant.  
To conclude, it can be stated that the current EU rules on jurisdiction and applicable law still 
do not seem entirely accommodated to the complexity and the global nature of infringements 
of data protection.  
  
(Contd.)                                                                  
agreement on jurisdiction, but with regard to defamation over Internet, was raised by A. Hoare, “Following on from the 
Australian Dow Jones decision on jurisdiction in Internet defamation, do compelling reasons exist for legislating for a 
new approach to this issue?”, (2004) Commercial Law Practitioner, 13.  
259
 See W. Blair, D. Quest, “Jurisdiction, Conflicts of Law and the Internet” in G. Ferrarini (ed.), Capital Markets in the Age 
of the Euro. Cross-Border Transactions, Listen Companies and Regulation (Hague: Kluwer, 2002), 164.  
260
 Moreover, this seems more appropriate for cyberterrorism than for data protection because the attempts to fight terrorism 
are global; see, in this regard, K. Gable, “Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and 
Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent”, (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 104 et seq.  
261
 Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, available on 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98 [Accessed 27 February 2015].  
262
 On the status of the convention, see ibid.  
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